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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(“CFIUS” or “the Committee”) is responsible for reviewing all 
foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in the United States for potential 
national security concerns raised by the transaction.  However, the 
executive orders, legislation, and regulations concerning the 
Committee (“the regulations”) have never defined “national 
security,”1 nor have they provided clear guidance regarding the 
scope of the Committee’s national security review.2  This 
uncertainty did not initially pose many problems because of the 
toothless nature of the Committee throughout most of its 
existence.3  However, with the increased focus on national security 
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1 See Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by 
Foreign Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 70702, 70705 (Nov. 21, 2008) (describing CFIUS’s 
rejection of comments that national security be defined in favor of a case-by-case 
review). 
2 Christopher M. Weimar, Note, Foreign Direct Investment and National 
Security Post-FINSA 2007, 87 TEX. L. REV. 663, 674 (2009) (“Like the term ‘national 
security,’ many of the above-mentioned factors are intentionally left open to 
interpretation by the Executive.”).  This lack of definition could potentially violate 
the Non-Delegation Doctrine or the Intelligible Principle Doctrine; however, such 
an analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. 
3 See Chip Yost, Bush Approves Sale of US Military Parts Suppliers to UAE 
Government, BALT. CHRON. (May 1, 2006), 
http://baltimorechronicle.com/2006/050106Chip.shtml (“The committee almost 
never met, and when it deliberated it was usually at a fairly low bureaucratic 
level,” according to former Reagan administration defense official Richard Perle, 
who described the process as “a bit of a joke.”).  However, some did note concerns 
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issues after September 11th and the passage of the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”), the lack 
of sufficient national security guidance in the CFIUS regulations 
has begun to impose significant costs on parties engaging in FDI. 
There is no accurate measure of these costs, but an analysis of 
the CFIUS review process, available data, case studies of significant 
cross-border deals, and other available information demonstrates 
that these costs are substantial.  From 2008–2012, a total of 538 
transactions underwent CFIUS review, but this number is 
increasing annually.4  The $542 million publicly reported value of 
these deals in the 2013 Annual Report is a severe underestimate, 
because it includes only the publicly reported value of just 
eighteen of the filed transactions.5  Furthermore, the true costs are 
not reflected in this data, as many other factors impose additional 
costs.  First, the failure to define national security increases 
uncertainty and delays transactions, significantly reducing the 
deals’ value.6  Second, parties will often expend considerable time 
and capital agreeing to the structure of a deal, only to see it 
collapse when it becomes apparent that CFIUS will block the deal.7  
Third, the Committee’s costs of monitoring and review are greater 
                                                     
about the scope of the Committee’s authority soon after its creation.  See W. 
Robert Shearer, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation 
Susceptible to Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1733 (1994) (“If Congress does not 
define and narrow Exon-Florio’s scope, this attitude may soon find expression at 
the expense of foreigners seeking to invest in the United States, and ultimately, to 
the detriment of the U.S. economy.”). 
4  Although the highest number of notices in one calendar year occurred in 
2008 with 155, the number of notices dipped dramatically in 2009 due to the 
financial crisis, reaching a low of 65.  For the complete lists of available statistics 
for 2008–2012, see COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS (2013) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2013]; COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE 
U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2012].  See 
generally Aimen N. Mir, CFIUS Staff Chair, Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. 
(CFIUS) (2012) (unpublished presentation slides). 
5  ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 30, 32.  In 2011, the financial value of 
the twelve publicly reported M&A transactions filed with the Committee was 
$682.25 million.  ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 4, at 28.  In 2010, the financial 
value of the seven publicly reported M&A transactions filed with the Committee 
was $1.4 billion.  COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
33 (2011) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2011].  In 2009, the financial value of the 
twelve publicly reported M&A transactions filed with the Committee was $3.2 
billion.  COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 26 (2010) 
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2010].  
6  See generally infra Section 4.3 (indicating that uncertainty regarding national 
security concerns can lead to additional costs). 
7  Id. 
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due to the absence of clear direction regarding the national security 
review.8  Finally, the lack of clarity regarding national security 
allows the Committee and the President to block transactions for 
seemingly political reasons, which can lead to retaliatory measures 
by the host countries of the companies whose investment is 
blocked.9  Each of these costs will likely continue to rise if the 
regulations are not amended to more clearly explain the national 
security evaluation process.10  Therefore, the regulations should be 
amended to provide additional clarity to investors, reducing these 
costs and promoting additional FDI, without diminishing the 
Committee’s ability to block transactions threatening U.S. national 
security. 
This paper will provide an overview of the history of the 
Committee, an analysis of the current regulations and the costs 
stemming from the failure to define national security, and a 
recommendation of how the regulations could be amended to 
reduce these costs.  Section 2 will provide a brief history of CFIUS, 
focusing on how the scope and potency of the Committee’s powers 
have gradually increased in response to certain proposed 
transactions.  Section 3 will explain the filing and review process 
under FINSA, with special attention paid to the limited guidance 
regarding the evaluation of national security threats.  Section 4 will 
discuss the costs of the current regime using basic economic 
principles, the Committee’s annual report to Congress, case studies 
of proposed transactions, and similar bodies in other countries.  
Finally, Section 5 will propose a potential solution that seeks to 
balance the Committee’s desire to maintain flexibility and the 
financial benefits of providing international businesspersons with a 
clear understanding of which transactions may be delayed or 
blocked by CFIUS. 
This paper proposes the creation of a regime that closely 
resembles prominent export laws in the United States.11  Under this 
regime, CFIUS would publish lists of industries and technologies 
that are presumed to raise national security concerns.  If the U.S. 
industry or technology sought by the foreign acquirer appeared on 
                                                     
8  See generally infra Section 4.4 (analyzing how the Committee’s costs may 
decrease with greater clarity regarding the evaluation of national security). 
9  See generally infra Section 4.5 (exploring potential retaliatory measures). 
10  See generally infra Section 3.4 (describing how costs have increased with the 
Committee’s scope). 
11  See generally infra Section 5 (discussing potential reforms). 
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the list, the foreign acquirer would cross-reference a country chart 
designating whether or not acquisitions of that specific industry or 
technology by an acquirer from that host country would be 
presumed to require a CFIUS national security investigation.  In 
addition, CFIUS would be granted the authority to designate 
certain companies as presumed threats to U.S. national security.  
However, CFIUS and the President would maintain discretionary 
authority to either permit transactions presumed to threaten U.S. 
national security, or block transactions not presumed to be national 
security risks.  By providing these clear criteria, the Committee 
could more effectively balance the encouragement of FDI in the 
United States with the protection of U.S. national security interests. 
2. BRIEF HISTORY OF CFIUS 
CFIUS was established by executive order in 1975.  This order 
granted the Committee “primary continuing responsibility . . . for 
monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United 
States . . . and for coordinating the implementation of United States 
policy on such investment.”12  Although the Committee had the 
authority to review transactions that “might have major 
implications for United States national interests,”13 it did not have 
the authority to block transactions posing national security risks.  
This came into sharp focus due to the rise of FDI under President 
Reagan, culminating with Fujitsu Ltd.’s attempted acquisition of 
Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. in 1986.14  Due to concerns of the 
deal’s opponents, such as the Department of Defense (“DoD”), that 
this would give the Japanese access to sensitive technologies that 
Fairchild provided to U.S. defense contractors, CFIUS initiated a 
review.15  Fujitsu withdrew its offer before the Committee 
completed its review, but this transaction served as a catalyst for 
granting CFIUS the power to block transactions affecting U.S. 
national security interests. 
This power came by way of the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment 
to Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (“Exon-Florio”).16  
                                                     
12  Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. § 990(1)(b) (1975).  
13  Id. at § 990(1)(b)(3). 
14  See Stephen K. Pudner, Moving Forward from Dubai Ports World—The 
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1279 
(2008) (analyzing FDI increases under President Reagan). 
15  See id. (delineating the concerns stemming from the Fujitsu deal).  
16  The Exon-Florio Amendment was passed as part of the Omnibus Trade 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/12
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Exon-Florio granted the President the power to initiate an 
investigation by CFIUS17 into the national security effects of 
transactions that may result in foreign control of a U.S. business or 
asset and to prohibit or suspend transactions that pose national 
security threats.18  The President could exercise this power if there 
was “credible evidence” of a national security threat,19 and no 
other provision of the law provided “adequate and appropriate 
remedy to protect the national security” interests of the United 
States.20  If the President exercised this authority, he was required 
to submit a written report to Congress.21  Finally, the President’s 
actions were not subject to judicial review,22 reflecting the 
deference given to the President on national security issues.23 
The next important expansion of the Committee’s powers came 
from the 1993 Byrd Amendment, which mandated that CFIUS 
                                                     
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). 
Executive Order 12661 implements the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988.  See Exec. Order No. 12661, 3 C.F.R. § 618 (1988) (stating a purpose of 
“ensur[ing] that the international trade policy of the United States shall be 
conducted and administered in a way that achieves the economic, foreign policy, 
and national security objectives of the United States . . . under the direction of the 
President . . .”); see also Mathew R. Byrne, Note, Protecting National Security and 
Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining the Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
849, 857 (2006) (attributing Exon-Florio as “a response to the serious decline in 
United States competitiveness and the rapid growth of our trade deficit.”) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100–40, pt. 1, at 2–3 (1987)). 
17  Executive Order 12661 designated CFIUS as the agency to run the 
investigation.  See Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. § 990(8) (1975) (“The Chairman 
of the Committee, in consultation with other members of the Committee, is hereby 
delegated the authority to issue regulations to implement Section 721 of the 
Defense Production Act”). 
18  See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170(a–d) (2000), amended by Pub L. 110–49, 121 Stat. 246, 259 (2007) (authorizing 
the President or his designee to “make an investigation to determine the effects on 
national security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers . . . by or with foreign 
persons which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate 
commerce of the United States” and allowing “the President [to] take such action 
for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any 
acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce in 
the United States . . . by or for with foreign persons so the such control.”).  
19  Id. at § 2170(e)(1). 
20  Id. at § 2170(e)(2). 
21  Id. at § 2170(g) (mandating the President to file reports upon the 
completion of an investigation).  
22  Id. at § 2170(e) (stating that the President’s decisions are not subject to 
judicial review). 
23  See Byrne, supra note 16, at 861 (asserting that placing Exon-Florio in 
Defense Production Act on trade shows the primacy of national security). 
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review all transactions where a foreign government controls the 
acquirer or where the acquirer acts on behalf of a foreign 
government.24  Following the attempted acquisition of LTV Steel’s 
Missile Division, which held DoD contracts, by Thomson-CSF, a 
French government-owned corporation, Congress issued the Byrd 
Amendment “to ensure that such deals were properly vetted in the 
future.”25  Therefore, Congress replaced the optional nature of 
Exon-Florio with a mandatory regime requiring an investigation 
any time a transaction would result in foreign control of a U.S. 
business or asset and pose a potential threat to the national security 
of the United States.26  Despite having little effect on the CFIUS 
process,27 the regime put in place by the Byrd Amendment would 
remain for over a decade before another transaction would 
threaten U.S. national security and spur further change to the 
CFIUS regulations. 
3. MODERN CFIUS REGULATIONS 
Two general trends contributed significantly to the 
implementation of the modern CFIUS regulations:  (1) the 
                                                     
24  National Defense Authorization Act of 1993 § 837(a), Pub. L. 102–484 
(1993) (mandating CFIUS investigations “in any instance in which an entity 
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any 
merger, acquisition, or takeover which could . . . affect the national security of the 
United States.”). 
25  Pudner, supra note 14, at 1277. 
26  The act also changed the President’s reporting requirements by mandating 
a report on whether or not the President took action instead of only when 
requiring an investigation, as under Exon-Florio.  The Byrd provision required a 
report anytime an investigation is conducted and the parties do not withdraw the 
transaction.  See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b), amended by Pub. L. 110–49, 121 Stat. 246, 
259 (2007) (describing the review procedures required by the act).  In addition, the 
Defense Production Act Amendments of 1992 implemented reporting 
requirements.  See also Defense Production Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102–
558, 106 Stat. 4198 (1992) (requiring reporting every four years as to whether there 
is a targeted attempt by other countries to attain U.S. critical technologies and 
whether there is economic espionage against the interests of the United States). 
However, they did not require a report on national security matters.  See Foreign 
Direct Investment, the Exon-Florio Foreign Acquisition Review Process, and H.R. 2624, 
the Technology Preservation Act of 1991, to Amend the 1988 Exon-Florio Provision: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. 
and Urb. Aff., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Foreign Direct Investment 
Hearings] (“[W]e have not defined national security.  I think the intent of Congress 
was very clear, that national security should be looked at in a broad sense” and 
defining it would let companies circumvent the definition). 
27  See Byrne, supra note 16, at 868 (“[T]he Byrd Amendment has had little 
actual effect on the Exon-Florio framework or process”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/12
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increased emphasis on national security issues in the wake of 
September 11th and (2) the global economic integration through 
globalization.28  With these trends as the backdrop, the proposed 
investments by China National Offshore Oil Corp. (“CNOOC”) in 
Unocal Corp. and by Dubai Ports World (“DPW”) in Peninsular & 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively, spurred action to bolster CFIUS’s powers.  CNOOC, a 
Chinese government-owned oil company, sought to acquire the 
American oil company Unocal, which would have resulted in 
CNOOC controlling Unocal’s oil reserves.29  Although CFIUS 
never approved or even reviewed the transaction, congressional 
fear that the Committee would not block the transaction led to calls 
to revise Exon-Florio.30  Soon thereafter, DPW, a state-owned ports 
management company from the United Arab Emirates, attempted 
to acquire Peninsular & Oriental Stream Navigation Co., which 
would have given DPW operating rights in six American ports.31  
When news broke that CFIUS had approved the transaction, it 
became clear that the Committee’s national security review was 
ineffectual, and a congressional maelstrom followed.32  In response, 
CFIUS and DPW agreed to a forty-five day investigation, but DPW 
ultimately arranged to sell its U.S. port leases to a U.S. company 
when Congress moved to force divestiture through legislation.33 
                                                     
28  James Mendenhall, Introductory Remarks at the Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: Economic Politics 
and National Security: A CFIUS Case Study (Apr. 11, 2008), in 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 245, 245–46 (2008).  
29  For a detailed discussion of the CNOOC transaction, see generally Joshua 
W. Casselman, Note, China’s Latest ‘Threat’ to the United States: The Failed CNOOC-
Unocal Merger and its Implications for Exon-Florio and CFIUS, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 155 (2007) (discussing the CNOOC transaction). 
30  See Byrne, supra note 16, at 852 (citing Christopher Corr, Pressures to Stiffen 
Exon-Florio: The Chinese Bid for Unocal Sparks a Firefight over Inbound Deals, MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS, DEALMAKER’S J. 36, (2006)) (explaining how calls to reform 
Exon-Florio arose).  
31  See id. at 851 (outlining the proposed deal structure) (citations omitted). 
32  See id. at 852 (“[M]any members of Congress had publicly and forcefully 
expressed grave reservations . . . .”); see also Ilene Knable Gotts et al., Is Your Cross-
Border Deal the Next National Security Lightening Rod?, 16 BUS. L. TODAY 31 (2007) 
(“[B]ipartisan political concern over port security caused DP World voluntarily to 
request that CFIUS conduct a new review of the transaction . . . .”).  
33  See Gotts et al., supra note 32, at 32 (“Ultimately, facing the threat of 
congressional legislation to force divestiture, DP World agreed to sell the U.S. port 
leases to a U.S. company.”).  For a discussion of congressional blocking of the 
DPW and CNOOC transactions, see David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional 
Notification Service, S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 83, 98–101  (2010) (describing the role of 
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The concerns surrounding these two proposed transactions led 
to the passage of the Foreign Investment in the United States Act of 
2007 (FINSA), which was the first statutory codification of CFIUS.  
FINSA’s preamble clearly states that the new rules are designed to 
“ensure national security while promoting foreign investment” 
and “to reform the process by which such investments are 
examined for any effect they may have on national security.”34  
This reflects how CFIUS is designed to balance foreign investment 
and national security;35 however, the regulations explicitly do not 
provide a definition for national security.36  Instead, the regulations 
state that guidance as to how national security should be defined 
will be published in the Federal Register.  Soon after FINSA’s 
passage, President George W. Bush issued an executive order that 
expanded CFIUS membership to a potentially vast number of 
agencies, clarified the President’s role in evaluating covered 
transactions, and explicitly authorized the use of mitigation 
agreements to resolve national security concerns.37  Finally, 
Treasury published the aforementioned Guidance Concerning the 
National Security Review Conducted by the Committee on Foreign 
                                                     
Congress in setting foreign investment policy as informed by CFIUS). 
34  Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Preamble, Pub. L. 
No. 110–49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007).  Executive Order 13456 amended Executive Order 
11858 to incorporate the changes made by FINSA, namely reviewing results in 
control by a foreign person.  It similarly states intent to support “unequivocally 
such investment, consistent with the protection of national security.”  Exec. Order 
No. 13456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (2008). 
35  Nova Daly, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law: Economic Politics and National Security: 
A CFIUS Case Study (Apr. 11, 2008), in 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 245, 248 (2008) 
[hereinafter Daly Statement].  
One of those lessons is that when people fear that the national security is 
jeopardized, they can take actions that also jeopardize an open 
investment environment.  So ensuring that people know that you are 
doing the due diligence you need to do to ensure national security can 
also ensure that America can maintain its open investment policy.  Id.  
36  Instead, the regulations state that guidance will be published in the 
Federal Register.  For a more detailed discussion, see Section 3.3 (discussing the 
definition of national security). 
37  Exec. Order No. 13456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008) (reiterating its 
objective of “support[ing] unequivocally such investment, consistent with the 
protection of the national security”).  The President will be involved when the 
Committee recommends blocking the transaction, is unable to reach a decision of 
whether the transaction should be blocked, or when the Committee requests that 
the President make the determination.  31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b) (2008) (codifying the 
executive order through implementing regulations). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/12
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Investment in the United States (“the Guidance”),38 which has a 
“narrow focus on national security alone” and disregards other 
national interests.39  However, as will be discussed below,40 the 
Guidance provides only vague direction on what constitutes a 
national security risk, resulting in a broad national security 
review.41 
With this legal framework in mind,42 the following subsections 
will address the current state of CFIUS.  This includes a discussion 
of the current members and their respective roles within the 
Committee, filing requirements for voluntary notices, an overview 
of the CFIUS review process, and an analysis of the scope of the 
Committee’s powers under the regulations.   
3.1. CFIUS Membership 
CFIUS is an interagency committee composed of fifteen agency 
heads with Treasury as the Chair.43  Of these members, Treasury 
                                                     
38  See generally Guidance Concerning the National Security Review 
Conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Guidance] (describing the regulatory 
guidance on national security review). 
39  See id. at 74568 (asserting that CFIUS focuses solely on real national 
security issues). 
40  See Section 3.3.2. 
41  See Jonathon G. Cedarbaum & Stephen W. Preston, CFIUS and Foreign 
Investment, in HOMELAND SECURITY: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 235, 241 (Joe D. 
Whitley & Lynne K. Zusman eds., 2009) (“FINSA leaves CFIUS with broad 
discretion to determine if a transaction threatens national security.”). 
42  In summary, the key legal bases of CFIUS are as follows: (1) § 721 of the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170; (2) Exon-
Florio (part of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988), Pub. L. 100–418, 
§ 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425–26 (1988); (3) Executive Order 11858, which established 
CFIUS as Executive Branch interagency committee; (4) Executive Order 12661, 54 
Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988), which delegated authority under Exon-Florio to 
CFIUS; (5) Executive Order 13456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008), which 
amended Executive Order 11858 to incorporate FINSA changes; and (6) 
Regulations pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign 
Persons, 31 C.F.R. Part 800.  The Guidance, supra note 38, supplements these 
regulations.  More information is available at www.treasury.goc/cfius.   
43  Under FINSA, the Attorney General’s office, the Departments of 
Homeland Security, Defense, Commerce, State, and Energy serve as full voting 
members, and the heads of the Department of Labor and the Department of 
National Intelligence (“DNI”) will serve as non-voting ex officio members.  See 50 
U.S.C. app. 2170(k) (listing Committee members under FINSA).  Executive Order 
13456 added the United States Trade Representative and the Director of the Office 
of Science and Technology to the Committee.  See Exec. Order No. 13456, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 4677 § 3 (Jan. 23, 2008) (supplementing the list of original Committee 
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and Department of National Intelligence (“DNI”) have particularly 
notable roles.  First, at the beginning of the review period, Treasury 
is responsible for designating a lead agency or agencies to serve as 
its co-lead throughout the review process.44  This designation 
normally goes to the agency with the most interest in or questions 
about the transaction.  If CFIUS determines that the transaction 
raises national security concerns, the co-lead agency’s role becomes 
increasingly important, because it will be responsible for 
negotiating, imposing, and monitoring mitigation agreements 
designed to address the national security threats posed by the 
transaction.45  Second, DNI46 shall “expeditiously carry out a 
thorough analysis of any threat to the national security of the 
United States posed by any covered transaction.”47  This analysis 
must be independent but must also incorporate the opinions of 
each reviewing intelligence agency.48  Therefore, DNI serves as the 
de facto agency responsible for making final determinations on the 
national security implications of a transaction. 
CFIUS’s structure reflects the Committee’s stated objective of 
                                                     
members and stating that the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of 
the Counsel of Economic Advisors, the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant 
to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism are all to “observe 
and, as appropriate, participate in” CFIUS reviews).  
 Finally, other agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, National 
Security Agency, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Transportation, 
may participate on a case-by-case basis as needed.  Id. at § 10 (observing that other 
agencies may assist as needed on the Committee’s request). 
44  See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(k)(5) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
designate, as appropriate, a member or members of the Committee to be the lead 
agency or agencies on behalf of the Committee . . . .”). 
45  See id. (outlining the steps the co-lead agency are required to take). 
46  DNI is an ex officio, non-voting member but receives all votes from other 
Committee members.  For a full description of DNI’s role, see 50 U.S.C. app. 
2170(b)(4).  
The Director of National Intelligence shall expeditiously carry out a 
thorough analysis of any threat to the national security of the United 
States posed by any covered transaction.  The Director of National 
Intelligence shall also seek and incorporate the views of all affected or 
appropriate intelligence agencies with respect to the transaction.  Id.  
47  50 U.S.C. app. 2170(b)(4)(A).  DNI can start its review before receiving a 
formal filing, so DNI prefers to receive notifications in advance. 
48  Id.  DNI must provide its opinion within 20 days but can be granted an 
extension.  50 U.S.C. app. 2170(b)(4)(B) (noting that the report must be filed “not 
later than 20 days” after the notice). 
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balancing national security and open investment policy.49  In 
addition, DoD seems to receive greater deference than other 
Committee members due to its omniscient presence in the national 
security space.50  Treasury’s position as Chair reflects concerns 
early in the Committee’s development that the national security 
review’s potential breadth could become a significant barrier to 
FDI.51  Moreover, Treasury’s authority is meant to “serve as a 
reminder to the outside world—and presumably to CFIUS 
members—that open investment is an important goal that should 
be sustained unless there are serious national security problems 
with a transaction.”52  However, since Treasury does not make any 
final determinations regarding whether to permit the transaction, 
other motivations supersede the encouragement of FDI.53 
3.2. Filing Requirements & Timeline of CFIUS Process 
According to the regulations, the entire CFIUS process can take 
up to ninety days and involve up to three primary stages.  First, 
CFIUS will conduct a thirty-day review, which is initiated by a 
voluntary submission by the parties or a request for a filing from 
the Committee, to determine if the transaction is “covered.”  
Second, the Committee may conduct a forty-five day investigation 
if it determines that the transaction may raise national security 
concerns.  Finally, the Committee may submit its recommendation 
to the President, who is given fifteen days to determine whether or 
not to block the proposed transaction. 
3.2.1. Filing & Initial Thirty Day Review 
CFIUS review can be initiated either by a voluntary notice by 
the parties to the transaction to CFIUS or a request for submission 
by the Committee.54  Although filing is technically voluntary, 
                                                     
49  See Byrne, supra note 16, at 893 (“Finally, the current membership structure 
of CFIUS and its preference to operate by consensus ensure that both national 
security and an open investment policy are protected, while not short-changing 
either goal.”). 
50  See id. (“Because of its unique role in the national security arena, the 
Department of Defense seems to be given a great degree of deference by other 
members of CFIUS.”). 
51  See Section 4.1 (describing the breadth of national security review).  
52  Byrne, supra note 16, at 893–94. 
53  This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4. 
54  For a notice to be considered complete, it must include the following: (1) 
terms of the transaction, including the parties, nature, and scope of agreement; (2) 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:11 AM 
1234 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:4 
CFIUS can request that parties submit the necessary materials if it 
determines that the transaction “may” be a “covered transaction,” 
which is defined broadly.55  In reality, the Committee’s request for 
a filing is actually a mandate, and it can be made up to three years 
after the completion of the transaction.56  As a result, it is in the 
parties’ interest to be proactive and voluntarily file with the 
Committee.  Voluntarily filing a complete notice not only improves 
the efficiency of the review process,57 but it also increases the 
certainty surrounding their transaction.  In addition, parties who 
voluntarily file receive regulatory safe harbor, immunizing them 
against subsequent CFIUS reviews and investigations once their 
transaction is approved absent misrepresentations during the 
CFIUS process.58  Therefore, it is in both the companies’ and the 
                                                     
description of assets; (3) description of U.S. company’s business activities, 
including classified contracts over the last five years and government contracts 
over prior three years if dealing with national security, defense, or homeland 
security; (4) details about products, technical data, technology, or services sold to 
U.S. government; (5) products, technical data, technology, or services for which 
the target is a “sole source” or a single “qualified source”; (6) products or services 
sold by third party and rebranded; (7) services target provided on behalf of or 
under the name of another entity; (8) DPAS-rated contract information; (9) 
products subject to EAR and/or ITAR listed and with details provided, including 
licenses and authorizations that will transfer; (10) documentation “relevant to” the 
target’s export classifications including any commodity jurisdiction 
determinations, completed or pending, or any Commerce classifications; (11) 
Department of Energy-related export activity; (12) toxins or special agents 
activity; and (13) any history of prior CFIUS activity.  31 C.F.R. § 800.402(c). 
55  See id. (explaining that if the Committee then determines that the 
transaction is covered, it will request a complete filing from the parties to the 
transaction). 
56   31 C.F.R. § 800.402 (observing reporting requirements for voluntary 
notices).  
57  See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74572 (“In CFIUS’s experience, the 
efficiency of reviews is also enhanced when parties to transactions voluntarily 
provide in their notice additional information that may be relevant to the notified 
transaction but which is not listed in § 800.402 of the Regulations.”); George 
Stephanov Georgiev, Comment, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory Framework: 
Mediating Between Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and National Security, 
25 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 131 (2008) (pointing to the efficiencies generated by filing 
voluntarily). 
58  See Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 239 (listing the three 
thresholds to be met for safe harbor).  For a criticism of the safe harbor provisions, 
see Weimar, supra note 2, at 676 (“The single greatest shortcoming of CFIUS 
review in the protection of national security is that it focuses almost singularly on 
threats perceived in transactions ex ante, yet it lacks any review of relevant 
activities once covered transactions have been completed”, which is compounded 
by the safe harbor provision); Georgiev, supra note 57, at 128 (describing the safe 
harbor provisions in the regulations).  
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Committee’s interests if the parties can clearly identify which 
transactions may raise national security concerns and voluntarily 
file to initiate the CFIUS process. 
If the Committee determines that a transaction is a “covered 
transaction,” it will commence an initial thirty-day review.  During 
this process, the Committee evaluates the transaction to determine 
if it threatens U.S. national security, results in foreign control of a 
U.S. business or asset, or results in foreign control of critical 
infrastructure that may impair U.S. national security.59  The 
regulations define “covered” as “any merger, acquisition, or 
takeover . . . by or with any foreign person which could result in 
foreign control” of any U.S. business, part of a U.S. business, or 
U.S. asset by a foreign person.60  The key element of this definition 
is “control,” which FINSA failed to define,61 requiring instead that 
CFIUS prescribe a definition.62  The final rule defines control in 
“functional terms as the ability to exercise certain powers over 
important matters affecting an entity.”63  This vague definition 
“eschews bright lines” and considers all relevant factors together 
                                                     
59  See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74568 (describing the national security 
review process). 
60  50 U.S.C. app. 2170(a)(3).  See also 31 CFR §§ 800.207, 800.301 (restating the 
definition of covered transactions).  This includes but is not limited to 
investments, joint ventures, and asset purchases, and includes transactions when 
foreign persons convey U.S. businesses or assets to another foreign person.  A 
covered transaction does NOT include: (1) stock splits, pro rata stock dividends, 
transactions resulting in a foreign person controlling less than 10% of U.S. 
business that are only for investment purposes (narrowly construed objective test 
looking for any rights to directorship, voting rights, etc.)—considering the 
timeline of when they will get ownership (if it will increase above 10% later), and 
noting that 10% is not a safe harbor—based on facts/circumstances and may not 
be recognized on discretion; (2) acquisition of an entity that does not constitute a 
U.S. business; (3) acquisition of securities or securities underwriter in the 
“ordinary course” of business; and (4) acquisition pursuant to insurance contract 
if made in the “ordinary course” of business.  
61  For definitions of the other terms used in the definition, see 50 U.S.C. app. 
2170(a) (defining a list of terms); Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70703–05. 
62  See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70704 (“FINSA does not define ‘control,’ but 
rather requires that CFIUS prescribe a definition by regulation.”). 
63 Id. (providing the complete definition as “power, direct or indirect, 
whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant 
minority of the total outstanding voting interest in an entity, board representation, 
proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal 
arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide 
important matters affecting an entity; in particular, but without limitation, to 
determine, direct, take, reach, or cause decisions regarding the [matters listed in § 
800.204(a)], or any other similarly important matters affecting an entity.”). 
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when determining if a transaction is covered;64 however, the 
definition becomes clearer by examining what is not considered 
control.  Most importantly, “a foreign person does not control an 
entity if it holds ten percent or less of the voting interest in the 
entity and it holds that interest ‘solely for the purpose of passive 
investment.’”65  Although this does not provide an exemption 
solely because the foreign person has less than a ten percent 
interest in the U.S. business or asset, it provides clear guidance to 
foreign direct investors.  Therefore, the definitions of “covered 
transaction” and each of their elements,66 in conjunction with the 
discussions and examples contained in the regulations,67 allow 
companies to assess if their proposed transaction is “covered” and 
potentially subject to CFIUS review. 
3.2.2. Forty-Five Day Investigation 
CFIUS concludes the vast majority of its reviews within this 
initial thirty-day review period.68  However, the Committee may 
commence a forty-five day investigation if the initial review 
reveals any of the following four situations:  (1) the transaction 
threatens to impair U.S. national security; (2) the lead agency 
recommends, and CFIUS concurs, that an investigation be 
undertaken; (3) the transaction will result in “foreign government-
control” of a U.S. business or asset; or (4) the transaction would 
result in foreign control of U.S. critical infrastructure that could 
                                                     
64 Id. 
65 Id. (citing § 800.302(b)).  The ten percent threshold is not, however, 
arbitrary or useless.  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 31 (considering (1) 
transactions notified under § 721; (2) non-notified transactions from which CFIUS 
required submissions; and (3) transactions resulting in a ten percent ownership 
stake of a U.S. company).  
66  The Federal Register includes discussions of “covered transaction,” 
“transaction,” “control,” “U.S. business,” “Foreign Person,” and “Transactions 
That Are and Are Not Covered Transactions.”  See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70704 
(elaborating on the meaning of each of the terms).  
67  31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (providing nine examples of covered transactions). 
68  Guidance, supra note 38, at 74568 (“CFIUS concludes action on the vast 
majority of transactions within this initial 30-day period”); Cedarbaum & Preston, 
supra note 41, at 238 (“CFIUS had traditionally approved the vast majority of 
notified transactions during the initial 30-day period, but a growing number of 
transactions are now being subjected to a second-phase 45-day investigation.”).  
The Committee may also recommend withdrawal, but that is rare at this stage.  
The clock will only stop ticking at this stage if the parties pull their filing, at which 
point they must notify CFIUS if they are going to resubmit or cancel the 
transaction.  Id. 
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impair U.S. national security.69  If any of these conditions exist, 
then CFIUS may instigate the forty-five day investigation.70  After 
an investigation, CFIUS only allows the transaction to proceed “if 
it has determined that there are no unresolved national security 
concerns,” which must be certified to Congress.71 
3.2.3. Mitigation Agreements 
CFIUS also has authority to “impose, and enforce, agreements 
or conditions to mitigate any national security risks posed by 
covered transaction[s].”72  From 2008 to 2010, sixteen transactions 
implemented legally binding mitigation agreements, ten of which 
occurred in 2010.73  Most agreements are reached during forty-five 
day investigations due to the difficulties in assessing national 
security risk, reaching an agreement, and implementing the 
agreement during the initial thirty-day review period.  CFIUS’s 
authority to enter into these agreements is limited in two 
significant ways.  First, CFIUS can only opt for mitigation after 
providing a written analysis that both assesses the national 
security risks proposed by the transaction and proposes measures 
to address those risks.74  Second, mitigation measures shall be 
imposed “only if” the risks are not adequately addressed by other 
                                                     
69 Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 238 (listing the four situations 
where an investigation is undertaken). 
70 Review is initiated if the lead agency recommends review and the 
Committee concurs, or if a member agency requests review and Treasury concurs.  
This investigation is not to be used as an extension and is limited to evaluations of 
the national security implications of a transaction.  The scope of the national 
security analysis will be discussed in Section 3.3.  The national security review is 
intended to be narrowly tailored.  See Daly Statement, supra note 35, at 249 (“So 
CFIUS is remaining a targeted, narrowly focused process that ensures national 
security.  It is not an economic means test, or an economic benefits test.  CFIUS 
remains focused on those important issues central to our open investment policy 
and important to ensuring that the world and America stays open to 
investment.”). 
71 Guidance, supra note 38, at 74568. 
72 Id.  This is authorized by Executive Order 11858.  See Exec. Order No. 
11858, supra note 12 (delineating the authority of CFIUS).  The lead agency for the 
transaction is responsible for carrying out and monitoring compliance with 
mitigation agreements.  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 20–21 
(describing means of monitoring and internal procedures).  
73 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 20 (noting mitigation agreements 
in the computer software, telecommunications, and energy sectors). 
74  See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74568 (“[B]efore CFIUS may pursue a risk 
mitigation agreement or condition, the agreement or condition must be justified 
by a written analysis . . . .”). 
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laws or regulations, such as the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (“ITAR”), the Export Administration Regulations 
(“EAR”), or the National Industrial Security Program Operating 
Manual (“NISPOM”).75  Mitigation agreements are a viable 
solution and include a variety of options.76  However, the 
discretionary authority CFIUS currently exercises may not be as 
narrowly tailored to case-by-case reviews as the regulations would 
suggest,77 weakening the claim that national security should not be 
more clearly defined in order to protect the individualized process. 
3.2.4. Presidential Power 
At the conclusion of the investigation period, CFIUS will either 
notify the President if it cannot determine if the transaction raises 
national security concerns or will make a recommendation to the 
President as to whether the transaction should be allowed to 
proceed or should be blocked due to unresolved national security 
issues.78  Using the Committee’s findings, the President will then 
exercise his sole authority to suspend or prohibit the transaction.79  
In order to do so, the President must find both that “[t]here is 
credible evidence . . . that the foreign interest exercising control 
might take action that threatens to impair the national security” 
and that other provisions of law do not “provide adequate and 
appropriate authority for the President to protect the national 
security.”80  However, the large majority of transactions are either 
                                                     
75  See id. at 74568–69 (listing other laws that potentially preclude mitigation 
agreements). 
76  Examples include limitations on foreign ownership through special 
security agreements, proxy agreements or proxy boards, limitations on voting 
rights, and divestitures of parts of the business assets through asset sales, limits 
on re-sales, and march-in rights, among other options.  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, 
supra note 4, at 20–21 (giving examples of measures required of businesses).  
77  See generally Zaring, supra note 33; see also id. at 117 (“These differences 
should not obscure the fact that the CFIUS agreements contain a lot of boilerplate, 
even though the Committee tailors its agreements, to a significant degree, based 
on the nature of the acquirer.”); id. at 117 (bringing into question if national 
security and mitigation is really case-by-case due to the presence of standard 
terms). 
78  Mir, supra note 4, at 6, 8 (describing the President’s authority to block 
transactions). 
79 Id. at 6; see also Guidance, supra note 38, at 74567 (describing how final 
interpretation of the national security threat is made by the President if CFIUS is 
unable to reach a decision). 
80 Guidance, supra note 38, at 74569. 
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approved by the Committee without investigation, withdrawn by 
the parties, or mitigated.  Therefore, only a small number of 
transactions have been referred to the President,81 and the 
President has only blocked two transactions using the authority 
granted under the CFIUS regulations.82  However, the President 
could play an increasingly important role in blocking future 
transactions.83 
3.3. National Security 
CFIUS review is limited to national security concerns, making 
the Committee’s national security evaluation the key determinant 
at each stage of the process.  Yet, despite the regulation’s clear 
definition of “control,” the regulations do not define national 
security and provide only limited guidance as to how it is 
interpreted.84  An examination of FINSA’s history suggests that the 
vagueness surrounding the Committee’s national security 
evaluation is indeed deliberate and is designed to give CFIUS 
broad authority to block FDI.85  This likely stems from concerns, 
particularly in the wake of 9/11 and the proposed CNOOC and 
DPW transactions, that the concept of national security evolves so 
quickly in response to new threats that it cannot be effectively 
defined.86  Therefore, instead of relying on a clear definition or 
                                                     
81 Precise figures cannot be obtained.  For estimations prior to the passage of 
FINSA, see generally Zaring, supra note 33.  
82 See Section 4.6. 
83 See Zaring, supra note 33, at 124 (footnote omitted) (“Other scholars have 
concluded that presidential power inevitably expands, both generally and more 
specifically in the arena of foreign affairs.  Further, critics of executive power in 
national security matters tend to assume that, as a descriptive matter, the 
executive calls the shots.  Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal, for example, have warned 
that Congress’s role in constraining the executive might ‘wither’ in foreign 
relations law unless the courts act to protect it.”). 
84 FINSA requires CFIUS to review covered transactions “to determine the 
effects of the transaction[s] on the national security of the United States,” but it 
does not define ”national security,” other than to note that the term includes 
issues relating to homeland security.  See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 (2007). 
85 See Foreign Direct Investment Hearings, supra note 26  (statement of William 
Barreda, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (“[W]e have not defined 
national security.  I think the intent of Congress was very clear, that national 
security should be looked at in a broad sense” and that defining national security 
would allow parties to structure transactions around the definition. Acting 
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Chester Paul Beach, Jr., expressed 
similar sentiments).  
86  See Daly Statement, supra note 35, at 249 (explaining that “[t]hey will not 
necessarily define ‘national security’ in and of itself: it is a hard concept to put 
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guidance, companies are forced to piece together a collection of 
sources that provide limited, vague direction regarding the 
national security evaluation.  These include FINSA and CFIUS’s 
other legal frameworks, the Guidance, and the annual reports.  
However, since these “are neither mandatory nor dispositive,”87 
they do not provide an ascertainable conceptualization of national 
security as applied to transactions. 
3.3.1. FINSA §721(f) Factors 
The CFIUS regulations do not define national security, but 
instead provide only a list of factors for the Committee and the 
President to consider when assessing the national security 
implications of a transaction.88  The regulations do not list 
industries or technologies generally subject to review,89 but the 
Committee considers whether the transaction will result in foreign 
control of government contractors and entities with access to 
classified information.90  Section 721(f) of the Defense Production 
                                                     
expressly on paper, but FINSA already provides good direction.”); see also Byrne, 
supra note 16, at 887, 888 (“[A]s presently constituted, the Exon-Florio system 
strikes a proper balance between national security and open foreign investment” 
due partially to lack of national security definition, which allows CFIUS to 
“respond to novel or emerging threats to national security.”); Zaring, supra note 
33, at 129, 130 (stating that “[n]ational security . . .  is a term that few international 
lawyers have dared to define, although it is the excuse commonly used to avoid a 
variety of legal obligations.  Although, since the onset of the war on terror, 
national security law has assumed prominence, it is still the subject of little 
international law scholarship” and that “other international institutions have 
produced their own cautious judgments on what might constitute national 
security.”).  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 133 (stating that “[b]ecause 
consideration of these factors is neither mandatory nor dispositive, their addition 
does not place rigid constraints on the CFIUS process, but it does suggest that the 
process would be more probing.  At the same time, the adopted version of the Act 
avoids earlier proposals to rank countries based on their counter-proliferation and 
counter-terrorism policies.  Such a review process would have rendered the 
review process more formulaic and less effectual”). 
87 Georgiev, supra note 57, at 133.  
88 See generally Guidance, supra note 38, at 74569–570 (listing the national 
security factors considered on a case-by-case basis). 
89 See generally Section 4.1 (citing the early concerns regarding national 
security). 
90 See generally Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and 
Takeovers by Foreign Persons; Final Rule, 31 C.F.R. Part 800 (2008) (stating that 
the transaction will result in foreign control of a U.S. business that provides 
products, technical data, technology or services—either as a prime contractor, a 
subcontractor, or a supplier to prime contractors—to U.S. government agencies, 
state and/or local governments.  This includes sole source arrangements, 
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Act of 195091 lists and the Guidance restates92 the factors 
considered by the Committee.  However, the categories are very 
broad and subject to interpretation by CFIUS and the President, 
leaving little certainty as to what transactions raise national 
security concerns.93 
Notably, CFIUS considers the potential effects instead of the 
realized effects of these factors, which gives the Committee 
significantly broader authority.  The factors include the 
transaction’s effects on:  (1) “domestic production needed for 
national defense requirements;” (2) “the capability and capacity of 
domestic industries to meet national defense requirements,” such 
as human resources, technology, and other supplies; (3) “a foreign 
person’s control of domestic industries and commercial activity on 
the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the 
requirements of national security;” (4) “U.S. international 
technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security;” 
(5) “the long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of 
energy and other critical resources and material;” (6) “U.S. critical 
infrastructure, including [physical infrastructure such as] major 
energy assets;” (7) “sales of military goods, equipment, or 
technology to countries that present concerns related to terrorism; 
missile proliferation; chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons 
proliferation; or regional military threats;” and (8) “transshipment 
or diversion of technologies with military applications, including 
the relevant country’s export control system.”94  In addition, the 
Committee and the President may also consider “whether the 
transaction could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign 
government or by an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a 
foreign government” and “the relevant country’s record of 
adherence to nonproliferation control regimes and record of 
                                                     
companies with access to classified information, companies with defense 
businesses, and national security-related law enforcement). 
91 See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(f) (listing factors added under FINSA). 
92 See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74569–70 (listing national security factors 
considered on a case-by-case basis by CFIUS and the President in determining 
whether a covered transaction poses a threat to national security). 
93 See Weimar, supra note 2, at 674 (explaining that “[l]ike the term ‘national 
security,’ many of the above-mentioned factors are intentionally left open to 
interpretation by the Executive”). 
94 Giovanna M. Cinelli & Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Jones Day, Presentation at 
the 2012 Export Briefing Series, CFIUS: A Primer for Foreign Companies 
Acquiring U.S. Assets or Businesses, Part I, 46–50 (June 15, 2012) (paraphrasing the 
national security factors listed in FINSA § 721(f)). 
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cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.”95 
These factors leave open a potentially unbounded range of 
interpretations, and it is becoming increasingly evident that CFIUS 
will not hesitate to exercise this discretion.96  Moreover, CFIUS is 
free to consider other factors as needed, which expands their 
interpretive authority even further.  This has led scholars and 
practitioners to speculate on more specific risks the Committee 
considers national security threats.97  However, these speculations 
do not provide much more specificity and have limited predictive 
value since the Committee does not provide them.  As a result, the 
vagueness of the factors and the Committee’s broad authority to 
interpret the potential effects a transaction has virtually eviscerated 
any predictive capabilities from FINSA §721(f). 
3.3.2. Guidance 
Recognizing the regulations’ failure to define national security, 
FINSA mandated that CFIUS publish guidance in the Federal 
Register “on the types of transactions that the Committee has 
reviewed and that have presented national security 
considerations.”98  However, the Guidance notes that it is 
                                                     
95 Id. at 51. 
96 See Section 5. 
97 For an example, see Weimar, supra note 2, at 667–68 (listing risks CFIUS 
has considered: (1) “Shutting down or sabotaging a critical facility in the United 
States;” (2) “Impeding a U.S. law-enforcement or national security investigation;” 
(3) “Accessing sensitive data, or becoming aware of a federal investigation or 
methods used by U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, including 
moving transaction data and records offshore;” (4) “Limiting U.S. government 
access to information for surveillance or law-enforcement purposes;” (5) 
“Denying critical technology or key products offshore that are important to 
national defense, intelligence operations, or homeland security;” (6) “Moving 
critical technology or key products offshore that are important for national 
defense, intelligence operations, or homeland security;” (7) “Unlawfully 
transferring technology abroad that is subject to U.S. export laws;” (8) 
“Undermining U.S. technological leadership in a sector with important defense, 
intelligence, or homeland-security applications;” (9) “Compromising the security 
of government and private sector information-technology networks in the United 
States;” (10) “Facilitating state or economic espionage through acquisition of a 
U.S. company;” (11) “Aiding the military or intelligence capabilities of a foreign 
country with interests adverse to those of the United States.”) (citing EDWARD M. 
GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 77 (2006)). 
98 See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170, at 261 (including “transactions that may constitute 
covered transactions that would result in control of critical infrastructure relating 
to United States national security by a foreign government or any entity 
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government”).  
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“necessarily illustrative” and “does not provide comprehensive 
guidance on all types of covered transactions that have presented 
national security considerations.”99  In addition, the Guidance 
“does not identify the types of transactions that pose national 
security risk, and it should not be used for that purpose.”100  As a 
result, parties to transactions cannot use the Guidance to either 
determine that their proposed deal is or is not considered a 
potential national security threat.  This means that all illustrations 
contained in the Guidance have little predictive value, leading to 
high levels of uncertainty with significant financial implications. 
The Guidance breaks the types of transactions that have 
presented national security concerns down into two extremely 
broad categories:  (1) those raising concerns due to “the nature of 
the U.S. business over which foreign control is being acquired” and 
(2) those raising concerns due to “the nature of the foreign person 
who acquires control over the U.S. business.”101  However, the 
broad nature of the categories and examples contained therein 
makes them both too general to be of use to parties to a cross-
border transaction.  Regarding the first category, the Guidance 
does not provide examples of industries, products, or other 
information to help identify which companies would raise national 
security concerns if subject to foreign control.  In fact, the Guidance 
explicitly avoids listing any industries that are commonly subject 
to CFIUS review.102  Instead, four general subcategories of 
companies are provided:  (a) government contractors,103 
(b) companies producing products with national security 
implications,104 (c) companies operating U.S. critical 
                                                     
99 See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74570 (stating that although CFIUS has had 
“extensive experience” in reviewing transactions, it does not provide a 
comprehensive list of which such transactions constitute a threat to national 
security”). 
100 Id. 
       101   Id.  
102 Id. (“CFIUS is focused on identifying and addressing national security 
risks posed by transactions, regardless of industry.  Accordingly, CFIUS does not 
focus on any one U.S. business sector or group of sectors”) (emphasis added).  The 
following industries are those that have been included: defense, smart grid, 
munitions manufacturing, aerospace, software, radar, information technology, 
telecommunications, energy, natural resources, industrial products, and structural 
engineering.  See also Jones Day, supra note 94, at 46–47 (listing industries of 
interest). 
103 Guidance, supra note 38, at 74570.  
104 Id. 
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infrastructure,105 and (d) companies producing certain advanced 
technologies.106  Finally, the Guidance notes, “a significant portion” 
of reviewed transactions presenting national security concerns 
“have involved U.S. businesses” dealing in “technology, goods, 
software, or services that are subject to U.S. export controls.”107  
These broad subcategories do not provide sufficient guidance to 
companies involved in transactions and could be construed to 
encompass virtually any U.S. business.  Moreover, these categories 
are not exclusive.  As a result, both CFIUS and the President have 
almost limitless discretion by either applying these general 
categories broadly or by identifying another category of U.S. 
businesses causing national security considerations when acquired. 
Regarding the second category, the Guidance provides even 
less information.  Besides repeating that CFIUS will consider “all 
relevant facts and circumstances relevant to national security,” the 
Guidance simply notes that transactions resulting in foreign 
government control of U.S. businesses or assets will more often 
raise national security issues than corporate reorganizations.108  In 
foreign government-controlled deals, CFIUS seeks to determine the 
purchaser’s capability to impair U.S. national security interests via 
its control of the U.S. business and the likelihood that it will do so.  
The Guidance lists certain factors relevant to this analysis109 but 
does not give an indication of how these factors are addressed, 
examples of their application, or quantifiable explanations.  
Therefore, parties seeking to invest in the United States cannot 
readily understand how these factors will be applied prior to filing. 
The directions regarding transactions when the acquirer is not 
a foreign government-controlled entity are similarly vague.  The 
                                                     
105 Id. at 74569. 
106 Id. at 74570–71. 
107 Id. at 74571 (the Guidance does not provide any examples of industries or 
products falling under this category, nor does it give any examples of export laws 
to which the products have been subject). 
108 Id. at 74571.  
However, as emphasized previously, the fact that a transaction presents 
a national security consideration does not necessarily mean that it poses 
a national security risk.  First, risk requires not only threat, but also a 
vulnerability in U.S. national security.  Second, the applicability of laws 
other than section 721 has often resolved any national security 
considerations identified by CFIUS when considering relevant national 
security factors.  Id.  
109   Id. (stating that CFIUS takes into consideration all the circumstances such 
as the policies of the foreign person, etc.). 
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Guidance first notes that these corporate reorganizations present 
national security concerns “only in exceptional cases,”110 and it 
states once again that the Committee “considers all relevant 
national security factors.”111  However, it does not provide any 
further explanation beyond one brief example.112  Therefore, 
international businesspersons are once again left without 
meaningful direction from either §721(f) or the Guidance as to 
which transactions will be subject to the Committee’s national 
security review. 
3.3.3. Annual Report 
 FINSA also requires CFIUS to submit an annual report on the 
covered transactions reviewed over the previous year.  The 
Committee is directed to include information regarding what 
CFIUS considered to pose a national security threat, such as the 
industries and countries involved in the investments.113  Most 
importantly, the regulations require CFIUS to include a detailed 
discussion of all perceived adverse effects of covered transactions 
on the national security or critical infrastructure of the United 
States that the Committee will take into account in its deliberations 
during the period before delivery of the next report, to the extent 
possible.114 
Therefore, the annual report is designed to provide companies 
with a greater understanding of which transactions may be 
considered national security risks in future years based on data 
collected over previous years.115  However, even though risk from 
                                                     
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112   Id. (explaining one example of a corporate reorganization that would raise 
national security considerations). 
113 See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(m)(2) (requiring “[c]umulative and, as 
appropriate, trend information on the business sectors involved in the filings 
which have been made, and the countries from which the investments have 
originated”). 
114 See id. at 265 (requiring the Committee to report “[t]he types of security 
arrangements and conditions” that it “has used to mitigate national security 
concerns about a transaction”). 
115 See Scott Morris, Remarks at Economic Politics and National Security: A 
CFIUS Case Study, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 245, 253 (2008) (mentioning that 
“[o]ur hope is that it will provide a great deal of information to the public, 
including to the companies who are users of CFIUS, about what is expected of 
them, about how CFIUS is looking at these issues, and about how it is thinking 
about national security”).  
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FDI is closely linked to certain technologies and industries,116 the 
publicly available version of the annual reports have only included 
vague information that is inadequate for parties seeking to invest 
in the United States.117 
The annual report’s discussion of sectors considered to be 
national security threats does not provide much clarity for foreign 
direct investors.  Instead of providing a list of industries or 
technologies that are prima facie national security threats, the 
annual report simply breaks down the covered transactions filed 
from 2008 to 2012 into four broad categories and certain select 
subcategories.  These categories are as follows:  (1) Manufacturing; 
(2) Finance, Information, and Services; (3) Mining, Utilities, and 
Construction; and (4) Wholesale, Retail, and Transportation.118  
First, the plurality of covered transactions has been in the 
manufacturing category with 41% of all CFIUS filings from 2008–
2012, and 48% of these transactions involved Computer and 
Electronic Products in 2012.119  Second, the Finance, Information, 
and Services sector accounted for 33% of covered transactions, and 
the Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services subsector made 
up approximately half of the transactions in this sector in 2012.120  
                                                     
116 See Weimar, supra note 2, at 667 (“Rather, the risks posed by FDI tend to 
be less systematic and more related to individual assets, sensitive defense 
technologies, and critical domestic infrastructure.”). 
117 Although the Committee prepares a confidential version of the annual 
report that includes “information on the acquirer and the U.S. business acquired, 
including the nature of their business activities or products, and details on any 
withdrawal,” for each individual transaction CFIUS reviews, this information is 
not available publicly.  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2. 
118 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 4 (showing table breaking down 
the categories by sectors); see also ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 3 (“Broad 
sectors are defined using North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
or Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of the target company.”).  
119 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 5 (showing percentages by 
category).  The primary Manufacturing sectors include: (1) Computer and 
Electronic Products; (2) Machinery; (3) Transportation Equipment; (4) Electronic 
Equipment, Appliances, and Components; (5) Chemical; (6) Fabricated Metal 
Product; (7) Textile Product Mills; and (8) Leather and Allied Product.  Id. at 5 
(listing sub-sectors).  For a breakdown of each sector into subcategories, see id. at 
6–15; however, this information lacks specificity. 
120 See id. at 8–12 (breaking down Finance, Information, and Services into the 
follow subcategories: (1) Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services; (2) 
Telecommunications; (3) Real Estate; (4) Publishing Industries (except Internet); 
(5) Administrative and Support Staff; (6) Credit Intermediation and Related 
Activities; (7) Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries; (8) Other 
Information Services; (9) Rental and Leasing Services; (10) Repair and 
Maintenance).   
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Third, Mining, Utilities, and Construction has accounted for 18% of 
covered transactions, and the Utilities subsector accounted for 
approximately half of the covered transactions in 2012.121  Finally, 
Wholesale and Retail Trade has accounted for 8% of covered 
transactions, and Support Activities for Transportation made up 
the largest subsector at 50% in 2012.122  These statistics, however, 
provide little value to companies determining if their transaction is 
covered, because they provide the proportions of covered 
transactions by industry and do not indicate whether national 
security concerns were raised.  
The annual report also provides a breakdown of covered 
transactions by the acquirer’s home country,123 including the 
sectors of the target’s business, for the 2010–2012 period.124  The 
most notable aspect of these tables is that the majority of the 
covered transactions involved an acquirer based in a country 
typically considered close allies of the United States.  For example, 
investors from the United Kingdom accounted for 21%, the 
overwhelming plurality of covered transactions, and Canada and 
France accounted for another 10% and 9%, respectively, of covered 
transactions.125  It is also important to note that the Committee did 
not note any clear investor tendencies based on the industry sector 
of the target company,126 and the Committee did not believe there 
was a coordinated strategy by any country to obtain U.S. critical 
technologies.127  Although these statistics illustrate that no acquirer 
host country is immune to review, companies will not be able to 
                                                     
121 See id. at 12–14 (providing a more detailed synopsis of covered 
transactions). 
122 See id. at 14–15 (giving a more elaborate summary of transactions that are 
covered). 
123 See id. at 17 (providing a synopsis of transactions by host country but 
noting that statistics do not account for the fact that some transactions involve 
multiple notices).  But see Georgiev, supra note 57, at 133 (“At the same time, the 
adopted version of the Act avoids earlier proposals to rank countries based on 
their counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism policies.  Such an approach 
would have rendered the review process more formulaic and less effectual.”). 
124 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 18 (providing a breakdown of 
transactions by both sector and host country). 
125 See id. at 16–17 (noting the countries filing the most covered transactions). 
126 See id. at 17–18 (observing only a few examples of industry concentrations 
of investments by county).  
127 See id. at 25 (stating that there was no identifiable foreign government 
strategy to acquire critical U.S. technologies).  For a breakdown of this analysis, see 
id. at 25–29. 
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discern anything ex ante about the national security implications of 
their transaction due to the lack of correlation between the 
countries and national security implications in the annual report. 
The annual report’s discussion of the perceived adverse effects 
of covered transactions on national security is even more limited 
and does not allow companies to make any reasonable predictions 
about the national security considerations raised.128  The details 
provided basically amount to a restatement of the factors listed in 
§721(f) with slightly different wordings and with certain factors 
named explicitly.129  The only technologies and industries 
mentioned explicitly are semiconductors, weapons and munitions 
manufacturing, aerospace, satellite, and radar systems, cyber 
security, and critical infrastructure.130  However, the listing of these 
factors does not provide any greater clarity, because these factors 
are clearly encompassed within the broad spectrum of §721(f) and 
are seemingly obvious industries to be subject to some form of 
CFIUS review.131  Finally, the report’s future projections of 
considerations likely to arise merely states, “CFIUS will consider 
whether the transactions may have the above-listed or any other 
adverse effects in determining whether the transactions pose 
national security risk.”132  Thus, companies achieve no greater 
understanding of the scope of the national security review. 
Therefore, the information considered in the annual report 
provides only a high-level analysis of covered transactions and 
does not provide companies with insight into whether CFIUS will 
consider their transaction covered.  Moreover, the factors are not 
mandatory or dispositive, which leaves unbridled authority in 
CFIUS’s hands when making national security determinations.  
Although some may argue that it will become easier for the 
Committee to identify trends and make predictions regarding their 
national security review as CFIUS matures in the post-FINSA 
                                                     
128  These reports are mandated under §721(m).  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, 
supra note 4, at 22 (considering “a broad range of national security considerations” 
and stating that the list is not exhaustive). 
129  See id. at 22–24 (stating the national security factors considered in 2012). 
130  See id. at 21–22 (listing the national security factors considered in 2012). 
131  See Zaring, supra note 33, at 131 (stating that “[d]efense contractors, raw 
materials providers, and high-technology industries are all particularly likely to 
be included in this encompassing view of what national security means in 
economic terms”). 
132  See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 22–23. 
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era,133 there is no evidence that CFIUS will provide more concrete 
guidance regarding its national security review.  In fact, the 
Committee’s reach seems to be expanding, adding further 
murkiness to the national security standard. 
3.4. Future of CFIUS 
An analysis of CFIUS’s history shows that the scope of its 
powers has been gradually increasing since the Committee’s 
creation in 1975.  Most notably, the political reaction stemming 
from the Dubai Ports World controversy led to the passage of 
FINSA, which greatly increased the Committee’s power and left 
the definition of national security open-ended.  As a result, CFIUS 
can reach a seemingly limitless array of transactions, and its 
powers are likely to continue to expand as more transactions are 
considered covered and subject to CFIUS review.  There is 
evidence that the Committee’s review has already extended into 
other arenas and may be reaching beyond the “national security 
rubric” when evaluating transactions involving energy and critical 
infrastructure.134  In addition, a recent congressional report 
recommended further extension of the Committee’s powers,135 and 
the President’s powers under CFIUS are likely to continue to 
expand.136  As a result, the costs explained in the following section 
are likely to grow until the CFIUS regulations are amended to 
include clear guidance on how it evaluates national security.137 
                                                     
133  See id. at 3 (noting the difficulty of identifying trends). 
134  See Morris, supra note 115, at 256 (discussing extending CFIUS’s reach to 
other, non-national security arenas and noting it will look at how new factors are 
applied to energy and critical infrastructure to see if national security focus is 
maintained).  For an example of how these interpretations have been extended, 
see discussion of Ralls Corp. in Section 4.6.1. 
135  See generally CHAIRMAN MIKE ROGERS & RANKING MEMBER C.A. DUTCH 
RUPPERSBERGER OF THE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., 
INVESTIGATIVE REP. ON THE U.S. NAT’L SEC. ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMS. 
COS. HUAWEI AND ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012), available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Hu
awei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf (discussing how the 
Committee’s powers should be expanded). 
136  See generally Section 4.6 (describing case studies where the expansion of 
authority may continue). 
137  See Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 242–43 (“[C]ompanies can 
expect that more transactions will be reviewed and that more reviews will be 
exacting, resulting in full, formal investigations” and “they should expect longer-
term interaction with, and oversight by, the relevant CFIUS agencies in the wake 
of any deal that raises national security concerns.”). 
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4. COSTS OF CURRENT REGIME 
The lack of clarity regarding “national security” in the CFIUS 
regulations imposes significant costs on parties engaging in cross-
border transactions due to the uncertainty regarding which 
transactions may be subject to review and the delays caused by the 
CFIUS review and investigation process.  This also increases the 
Committee’s review costs, because many companies do not suspect 
that their deal will be subject to CFIUS review and do not file a 
voluntary notice or do not provide adequate filings.  Thus, 
although the Committee provides annual reports on the deals 
subjected to CFIUS review, the figures provided do not accurately 
reflect the effects that failing to provide sufficient direction on the 
national security review inflicts on parties engaging in cross-
border deals.  In addition, many transactions are withdrawn while 
undergoing CFIUS review or break down due to the restrictions 
imposed by the regulations.138  Finally, many countries have 
created similar government bodies, exposing U.S. businesses 
seeking to invest abroad to retaliatory measures.  As a result, the 
lack of clarity surrounding the national security provision in the 
CFIUS regulations imposes costs that far exceed any reportable 
statistics. 
4.1. Early Concerns 
Concerns regarding the lack of a national security definition 
predate the enactment of FINSA, as many commenters on the 
regulations noted the potential costs that failing to provide a 
definition would have for foreign direct investors.139  Chief among 
                                                     
138  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 19 (“In 2012, CFIUS approved 
withdrawal of 22 notices.  The parties withdrew two notices during the 30-day 
review period and twenty notices after the commencement of the 45-day 
investigation period.  In ten cases, parties re-filed in 2012, and CFIUS concluded 
action in those cases.  In two cases, the parties re-filed in 2013.  In the remaining 
cases, the parties abandoned the transaction for commercial reasons or in light of 
CFIUS’s national security concerns, as described above.  As noted previously, the 
number of withdrawals in 2012 is a function of the specific facts and 
circumstances of the particular transactions reviewed by the committee.”).  Parties 
may be withdrawing because these delays make the transaction no longer 
feasible.  
139  See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70705 (discussing commenters’ statements 
regarding the scope of 31 C.F.R. § 800.101 and the implications of failing to define 
national security); Shearer, supra note 3, at 1768 (“One of the most consistent 
complaints directed at the statute concerns its failure to articulate clear guidelines 
for determining what type of transaction may impair national security.”) (citations 
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these concerns was that the ambiguity of the national security 
factors could be used for protectionist purposes,140 which would 
negatively impact the U.S. economy.141  Therefore, prior to the 
broadening of CFIUS’s power under FINSA, commentators had 
already recommended that the Committee truly define national 
security by providing a list of technologies, industries, or countries 
raising national security concerns, or by creating a multi-factor test 
to make national security determinations.142  Despite these 
comments, the final regulations note that national security reviews 
must maintain flexibility and be conducted on a case-by-case 
basis.143  While this greatly increases the Committee’s authority, 
these early concerns regarding the costs of this uncertainty have 
proven correct. 
                                                     
omitted).  
140  See Shearer, supra note 3, at 1735 (“While Exon-Florio ostensibly serves 
the legitimate purpose of helping to protect U.S. national security, its vague 
parameters and elastic provisions create a potent protectionist weapon that 
virtually invites abuse.”) (citations omitted). 
141  See id. at 1733 (“If Congress does not define and narrow Exon-Florio’s 
scope, this attitude may soon find expression at the expense of foreigners seeking 
to invest in the United States, and ultimately, to the detriment of the U.S. 
economy.”). 
142  See Byrne, supra note 16, at 869–70 (“Various requests were made to 
Treasury to define national security in the mergers and acquisitions context by 
positive or negative lists, or by creating a multi-factor test.  However, Treasury 
rejected these suggestions because they were too limiting on the President’s 
ability to affirmatively act to protect national security, and provided insufficient 
guidance to corporations; rather Treasury stated that ‘national security’ should be 
‘interpreted broadly and without limitation to particular industries.’  The 
Committee also refused to issue guidelines outside of the Code of Federal 
Regulations to generally describe national security, or to issue summaries of its 
decisions.”). 
143  See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70705 (discussing case-by-case approach 
adopted in § 800.101).  Also note that some people thought the regulations were 
not strong enough for national security purposes, but they still thought the 
national security factors were too vague.  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 129 
(“Prominent among the criticisms was the view that because CFIUS is chaired by 
the Department of the Treasury, economic concerns would prevail over national 
security concerns.  Furthermore, the definition of ‘national security’ was 
sometimes interpreted too narrowly and the list of factors used to evaluate 
national security threats was viewed as too vague.”); id. at 133 (“Because 
consideration of these factors is neither mandatory nor dispositive, their addition 
does not place rigid constraints on the CFIUS process, but it does suggest that the 
process would be more probing.  At the same time, the adopted version of the Act 
avoids earlier proposals to rank countries based on their counter-proliferation and 
counter-terrorism policies.  Such an approach would have rendered the review 
process more formulaic and less effectual.”). 
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4.2. Available Data 
The annual reports filed by CFIUS provide statistics regarding 
the number of CFIUS reviews and the measurable financial impact 
of these reviews.144  When taken at face value, these statistics 
should not “strike terror into the hearts of foreign direct 
investors.”145  Indeed, as of 2010, CFIUS had only recommended 
that the President block a transaction on five occasions,146 and the 
President recently blocked a transaction following CFIUS review 
for only the second time in history.147  According to some, the first 
instance, President Bush’s MAMCO order,148 “begged presidential 
action” due to the unique nature of the transaction.149  However, 
the impact of the Committee’s actions extends “far beyond sample 
statistics,” because “[b]locking a transaction is a crude tool and 
serves no purpose when more subtle remedies are available.”150  
Thus, CFIUS review often causes parties to withdraw from close-
to-complete transactions without taking any formal action to block 
                                                     
144  The public version of the report contains only vague information, 
whereas the classified version contains significantly more detail.  See ANNUAL 
REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that tables containing information about the 
acquirer and the U.S. business acquired is contained in the classified report but 
that the public report contains only aggregate data).  This is partially due to 
companies’ concerns about disclosure of their confidential information.  See 
Weimar, supra note 2, at 235 (noting companies’ concerns about the disclosure of 
their information in reports to Congress). 
145  See Zaring, supra note 33, at 106 (indicating that CFIUS actions have 
remained relatively stable). 
146  Id. at 105 (“Over the life of CFIUS, the Committee has recommended to 
the president that an acquisition be prohibited in only five cases; in all but one of 
those cases, the president allowed the acquisition to proceed.”). 
147  See Section 1.  See also ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that 
the President blocked Ralls Corporation’s wind farm project as a result of the 
company’s Chinese ownership). 
148  See Order on the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export 
Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc., in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES BOOK I, 143 (1990) [hereinafter Order] 
(prohibiting acquisition by MAMCO due to national security concerns).  
149  See Zaring, supra note 33, at 104–05 (“That case . . . involv[ed] . . . an 
American airplane parts manufacturer and a Chinese company that was [sic] both 
owned by China’s Ministry of Aerospace Technology and affiliated with the 
People’s Liberation Army.”). 
150  See id. at 106 (“When the subtlety of the remedy is taken into account, the 
Treasury says, ‘CFIUS has been very successful.’”) (quoting U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, 
STAFF ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE’S REPORT: FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, UNENCUMBERED ACCESS 2 (1991)).  
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the transaction.151  Although the number of transactions 
withdrawn in such a manner was initially not very large,152 it has 
likely increased dramatically since FINSA.  As a result, a greater 
number of transactions are being prevented “with a wink and a 
nudge,” but statistics of these instances are unobtainable.153  
Therefore, when evaluating these statistics, it is important to 
remember that the impact is much greater than the statistics 
provided.154 
Given the significant strengthening of the Committee’s powers 
under FINSA and the scarcity of available data, only the statistics 
compiled since 2008 are relevant to this analysis.155  In addition, it 
is also important to note that the revision of the regulations 
coincides with the 2008 financial crisis, which has significantly 
                                                     
151  See id. at 107 (“[O]bservers like Eliot Kang have been persuaded that 
‘CFIUS’s investigatory scrutiny has led a number of foreign buyers to withdraw 
from ‘done-deals’ or modify the terms of purchase.’  For example, informal 
consultations may have deterred Dubai’s sovereign wealth fund from following 
through on two recent proposed acquisitions of American assets.  The managing 
director of the fund noted that the deals ‘might meet political opposition in the 
U.S.,’ though it is hard to know whether this opposition came from Congress or 
reflected pressures from CFIUS itself.”) (quoting C.S. Eliot Kang, U.S. Politics and 
Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, 51 INT’L ORG. 301, 334 (1997)). 
152  See id. at 108 (“[T]here is reason for some skepticism about the possibility 
that the Committee is a blocking machine.  The news stories that do report that 
mergers have failed on word from CFIUS are few, despite the fact that failed 
mergers are actively covered in the business press.  The Treasury Department has 
said that the Committee approves most deals without a peep, and it downplays 
the threat posed by the Committee when it meets with foreign officials.  
Accordingly, the isolated cases of blockage that we do know about look more like 
rare exceptions rather than exemplars of the rule.”). 
153  See id. (“Accordingly, it is possible that CFIUS frequently blocks foreign 
acquisitions with a wink and a nudge—we simply do not, and probably cannot, 
collect the data on the subject, with only news stories and fleeting allusions in 
reorganization opinions to guide us.”).  There is also no guidance as the number 
of mitigation agreements entered into.  See id. (“It is hard to say how frequently 
CFIUS imposes these agreements, as it does not report on the number of 
mitigation agreements that it has concluded (or, for that matter, on anything other 
than to Congress, and even then reports are often confidential . . . . [M]embers of 
the Committee themselves have often said that conditions are rarely imposed on 
foreign acquisitions . . . .”). 
154  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 129 (“When evaluating these criticisms, it is 
important to remember that the number of foreign acquisitions that require CFIUS 
review is very small and that the potential for harm in the form of negative 
business attitudes towards U.S. firms abroad is disproportionately large”). 
155  For statistics from the years prior to the passage of FINSA, see generally 
Weimar, supra note 2; see also Zaring, supra note 33, at 104–06 (providing table of 
the aggregate CFIUS data from September 1998 until December 2007 and a chart 
on changes in CFIUS notifications over time). 
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reduced the amount of FDI in recent years.156  From 2008 to 2012, a 
total of 538 notices were filed with the Committee, resulting in 168 
investigations, 32 withdrawals during review, 38 withdrawals 
during investigation, and one presidential decision.157  These 
statistics indicate that the number of transactions being reviewed, 
as well as the number undergoing CFIUS investigation, is much 
higher than prior to the passage of FINSA.158  Although the 
number of notices dropped significantly due to the financial crisis, 
the number of notices and investigations has since increased 
annually.159  In 2012, the number of notices withdrawn after 
commencement of an investigation increased from five in 2011 to 
20 in 2012, and the President blocked a transaction for the first time 
since 1990.160  These transactions represent a small percentage of 
the total of such FDI flows into the United States, and the 
Committee is not notified of many of the covered transactions 
reviewed each year.  This suggests that many companies are 
unaware of CFIUS’s reach, or do not believe their transactions are 
potentially subject to the CFIUS process.  Therefore, providing 
greater certainty through revisions to the CFIUS regulations could 
affect significantly more transactions than the numbers reported 
here. 
Information about the financial value of the deals subjected to 
the CFIUS process is even sparser.  The only monetary value 
provided in the annual report is the estimated $542 million value 
of seven transactions with identifiable values involving investors 
from countries complying with the boycott of Israel in 2012;161 
                                                     
156  See generally Eric Lipton, Questions on Security Mar Foreign Investments, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/business/18invest.html.  See also ANNUAL 
REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 2 (“There was a significant decline in the number of 
notices from 2008 to 2009, coinciding with the global financial crisis, followed by 
an appreciable increase in 2010”). 
157  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 3 (providing table breaking 
down deals). 
158  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 129 (“The transactions which CFIUS 
needed to investigate comprise only two percent of the total number of notified 
transactions.”). 
159  Id. 
160  See id; see also infra Section 4.6.1. 
161  There were 18 transactions involving countries that boycott Israel; 
however, only seven had identifiable values.  The transactions included: nine 
from the United Arab Emirates, five from Qatar, two from Kuwait, one from 
Lebanon, and one from Venezuela.  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 30.  
In 2010, five of the deals were from the United Arab Emirates and totaled a value 
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however, the annual report itself acknowledges that this figure has 
no representative value relative to the entirety of the CFIUS 
process.162  First, this represents only seven of the 93 transactions 
filed with CFIUS.  Second, this only includes the publicly reported 
values of those seven transactions, and most transactions do not 
make this information public.163  Therefore, this financial data is of 
virtually no predictive value but can be assumed to be significantly 
larger than reported based on the following direct and indirect 
effects. 
4.3. Uncertainty & Delay 
The most apparent of the additional costs that can be attributed 
to failing to adequately inform parties about the national security 
evaluation are the financial costs of uncertainty and delay.  First, it 
is both a commonly understood economic principle and a 
foundational principle of contract law that uncertainty is extremely 
detrimental in the business context.  By reducing uncertainty, 
parties are better able to make informed business decisions in the 
present and plan for future business arrangements.  Therefore, the 
uncertainty surrounding how “national security” will be 
interpreted can impose severe costs onto the parties to the 
transaction.164  Second, the entirety of the CFIUS review process 
can take ninety days for one transaction.165  This can decrease the 
                                                     
of $1.353 billion.  One transaction was from Kuwait and was valued at $40 million.  
One transaction was from Lebanon and had no reported value. Id. at 32.  Four of 
the transactions involved information services valued at $1.113 billion.  One 
transaction involved commercial space travel and was valued at $280 million.  
One transaction each involved semiconductors and telecommunications services, 
but neither had a reported value.  See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 34. 
162  See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
163  Id. at 33. 
164  See Shearer, supra note 3, at 1768 (“[B]ecause the ‘national security’ 
standard is susceptible to various interpretations, foreign investors face many 
uncertainties when structuring acquisitions involving a company engaged in U.S. 
interstate commerce.”) (citations omitted).  One benefit of voluntarily filing is 
reducing this uncertainty.  See Byrne, supra note 16, at 888 n.221 (noting that 
“[s]ome in the business world argue that the lack of a definition creates 
uncertainty, and criticize the fact that the approach to national security depends 
on the particular views of the presidential administration in place at any 
particular time.”) (citations omitted); Georgiev, supra note 57, at 128 (discussing 
the potentially “waste[d] resources” involved in transactions that are unlikely to 
receive CFIUS approval). 
165  If the Committee conducts the 30-day review, 45-day investigation, and 
15-day presidential decision process, then Committee approval will take 90 days. 
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value of the deal and expose it to many risks, particularly in the 
volatile international business context,166 and has the potential to 
make the deal no longer profitable or desirable.  Taken together, 
this uncertainty can lead to a chilling effect that discourages 
foreign businesses from investing in the United States.  However, if 
parties were able to determine whether their transaction raises 
national security concerns and is subject to this delay, they could 
contract in a manner that reduced the financial impact of the delay.  
Therefore, by reducing the uncertainty and unexpected delays 
stemming from CFIUS’s national security review, FDI would be 
more profitable.167 
4.4. Increase in Review Costs 
Businesses are not the only parties that would benefit from 
greater clarity regarding how national security is evaluated—
CFIUS’s operating costs would also be reduced dramatically 
without sacrificing the effectiveness of its review.  Although the 
regulations and the Guidance were intended to prevent companies 
from pursuing transactions destined to be blocked and to 
encourage interaction between businesses and the Committee, 
interaction between CFIUS and the private sector is extremely 
limited.168  Since CFIUS does not provide adequate direction on its 
national security evaluations, many companies falsely assume that 
their transaction will not require review.169  This stems from either 
a general lack of awareness of the Committee or certain incorrect, 
yet reasonable, assumptions businesses make about CFIUS’s 
national security review.170  Therefore, instead of anticipating the 
Committee’s review and filing a sufficient notice, businesses are 
caught off guard when CFIUS requests a filing.  This often leads to 
hastily prepared filings or contentious interactions between CFIUS 
                                                     
166  For example, currency values may change during this period of delay. 
167  See Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 252 (stating that an effective 
regime would identify and resolve national security concerns “before the 
transaction is formally submitted for review”) (emphasis added). 
168  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 128 (acknowledging the benefits of filing 
voluntary notice but stating that “the dialogue between the regulator and 
companies has halted in the aftermath of the DP World controversy.”). 
169  See Section 4.6.1 (detailing a circumstance which required review). 
170  For a discussion of common misperceptions about the CFIUS process, see 
Common Misconceptions Regarding CFIUS and the CFIUS Process, JONES DAY 
COMMENTARY (June 2012), 
http://www.jonesday.com/common_misconceptions_regarding_cfius/. 
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and the businesses,171 which unnecessarily wastes CFIUS resources 
that could be saved if the businesses provided sufficient, timely 
filings that allowed for a more efficient review.  This could help 
counteract concerns that providing clear guidance regarding 
national security would expose the United States to increased risk.  
The Committee has historically struggled to identify all 
transactions subject to review, meaning that the Committee never 
reviews certain threatening transactions, or it reviews them after 
closing.172  This is likely to continue as FDI increases following the 
recession and as the scope of the Committee’s review grows, which 
could make the process “unwieldy.”173 
Therefore, by providing businesses with a clear understanding 
of which transactions may raise national security concerns, CFIUS 
could reduce its costs in two significant ways.  First, CFIUS could 
reduce its costs of monitoring all FDI to identify potentially 
threatening transactions that have not been filed with the 
Committee.  This would also have the added benefit of reducing 
the likelihood that a threatening transaction goes unnoticed.  
Second, the Committee could reduce its costs during the review 
and investigation stages, because businesses would be more likely 
to file voluntary notices containing all the necessary information 
for the Committee to make a national security determination.  In an 
era of tightening government budgets, these savings would 
undoubtedly be welcome. 
4.5. Retaliatory Measures 
Retaliatory measures by foreign direct investors and their host 
countries pose another immeasurable, though possibly the largest, 
cost of failing to offer clear guidance on which transactions will be 
subject to national security review.174 
                                                     
171  Examples include Ralls Corp. and Firstgold.  See generally Section 4.6.1; see 
also Matthew C. Sullivan, Mining for Meaning: Assessing CFIUS’s Rejection of the 
Firstgold Acquisition, 4 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 12, 15 (2010) (citing Firstgold 
as “a reminder to all foreign investors of the perils they may face if ill-prepared 
for the CFIUS review process”). 
172  See Shearer, supra note 3, at 1769 (stating that “many potentially 
threatening foreign acquisitions escape CFIUS’s attention” because of the lack of 
guidance). 
173  See Weimar, supra note 2, at 676 (“As greater swaths of FDI become 
subject to CFIUS review, the process threatens to become unwieldy.”). 
174  International law permits exceptions for national security reasons.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 407 (1987) 
(permitting exceptions to the presumption of extraterritoriality based on the 
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In response to actions by the Committee that are seen as 
protectionist,175 foreign businesses and governments often respond 
by taking measures that decrease international business 
opportunities for the United States and its companies.  The 
potential damages to the U.S. economy are severe since the U.S. 
trade deficit is already over $34 billion.176  These measures take two 
separate forms:  (1) avoiding future investment opportunities in 
the United States and (2) preventing FDI by the United States.177  
This is particularly likely to occur with China, which has already 
implemented a similar regulatory body that could block U.S. 
investment in China.178  Although it is difficult to establish a direct 
link between CFIUS’s actions and these retaliatory measures or to 
quantify the costs of these retaliatory measures, there is sufficient 
evidence to show that these costs are significant and likely to 
increase. 
4.5.1. Avoiding Future Investments 
Businesses value certainty179 and freedom from intervention by 
regulatory bodies.  Therefore, as foreign direct investors become 
                                                     
“effects” and “protective” principles). 
175  See Sullivan, supra note 171, at 16, 17 (citing the Firstgold case which 
indicates that CFIUS actions occasionally result in retaliatory action). 
176  See Lucia Mutikani, Weak Imports Drive U.S. Trade Deficit to Four-Year 
Lows, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2014, 1:02 PM), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/07/us-usa-economy-
idUSBREA060HJ20140107 (stating that “[t]he trade gap [has fallen] 12.9 percent to 
$34.3 billion,” according to the U.S. Commerce Department).  
177  See Sullivan, supra note 171, at 17 (summarizing that “the critical Global 
Times editorial argued that CFIUS’s reaction ‘would hold back many thriving 
Chinese companies from investing in the attractive but politically dangerous 
American market,’ and warned of a belief ‘in some quarters that striking down 
Firstgold investment proposal, although it is small, may deal a blow to U.S.-China 
relations.  It probably will.’”) (citing Editorial, Toxic Mood over China’s Investment 
in the US, GLOBAL TIMES (Dec. 23, 2009), 
http://opinion.globaltimes.en/editorial/2009-12/453755_2.html);  see also 
Shearer, supra note 3, at 1769 (“[F]oreign direct investment into the United States 
will decrease and foreign countries are likely to retaliate by increasing the barriers 
to U.S. companies seeking to invest abroad.”). 
178  See generally China Publishes Final Rules on the National Security Review of 
Foreign Investment in Chinese Companies, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.jonesday.com/china_publishes_final_rules/(remarking that China 
has implemented new rules that provide for review and potential rejection of 
acquisitions of Chinese companies by foreign investors where such acquisitions 
could affect national security). 
179  See Section 4.3 (delving into how uncertainty affects business). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/12
12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:11 AM 
2014] DEFINING ‘NATIONAL SECURITY’ 1259 
more aware of transactions subjected to CFIUS review, they will 
become increasingly wary of investing in the United States.180  
Although these decisions cannot be directly linked to Committee 
actions, decreases from particular regions or countries seem to 
coincide with high profile actions taken by the Committee.  For 
example, analysts estimate that “foreign investment in the United 
States originating from the United Arab Emirates alone fell by over 
$1 billion in 2006” as a result of the Dubai Ports World 
controversy.181  Similar statistics likely stem from other high-profile 
actions by the Committee, such as the Firstgold,182 CNOOC,183 and 
Ralls Corporation (“Ralls Corp.”)184 incidents, each of which 
involved attempted investments by Chinese corporations.  These 
responses will be exacerbated by the expansion of national security 
into other non-traditional defense industries like wind energy, 
because foreign businesses will be uncertain whether their 
technology fits into the virtually limitless application of national 
security.185 
4.5.2. Preventing FDI from the United States 
Foreign governments are also likely to take retaliatory 
measures to prevent FDI by U.S. businesses within their borders if 
they perceive actions by the Committee as protectionist.  By adding 
the critical infrastructure and critical technology, the factors used 
when making national security determinations have been criticized 
as “broadly over-inclusive,” which “threatens to send the message 
that the United States is taking an increasingly protective stance 
toward FDI.”186  Indeed, many perceive CFIUS as a tool for 
                                                     
180 See Sullivan, supra note 171 (observing that Chinese investors continue to 
fear U.S. resistance to acquisitions, which would result in the likelihood of 
decreased investments due to uncertainty). 
181  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 131 (indicating that investment in the 
United States decreased as a result of the Dubai Ports World controversy) (citing 
DP World’s Long Shadow, THE ECONOMIST (June 14, 2007), at 74–75).  
182  See Sullivan, supra note 171 (recognizing the impact of the Firstgold case 
on foreign businesses).  
183  See generally Section 3 (discussing the CNOOC investment). 
184  See Section 4.6.1 (describing the investment by Ralls Corp.). 
185  See Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41 (analyzing the national security 
provisions as a “wide-open” standard and remarking that “[v]irtually any deal 
involving foreign interests on the acquiring side and U.S. assets on the acquired 
side is a possible candidate for CFIUS review”). 
186  See Weimar, supra note 2, at 677 (criticizing the FINSA as being 
“overinclusive”); Georgiev, supra note 57, at 125 (“The frequent political 
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protectionist measures,187 and the broad nature of the national 
security definition could allow for more protectionist actions in the 
future.188  Whether or not these claims are valid, the perception of 
protectionism by the United States is likely to strain international 
relations189 and can lead to retaliatory measures that block U.S. 
foreign investment within that country.190 
Many countries have begun implementing CFIUS-style bodies 
                                                     
opposition to foreign acquisitions can be driven not only by genuine national 
security concerns, but also by protectionist impulses.”); see also Sullivan, supra 
note 171 (noting the political opposition to acquisitions by foreign investors). 
187  See Pudner, supra note 14, at 1292 (“While CFIUS serves a vital role in 
protecting the national security of the United States, it can, and has been, abused 
as a tool for economic protectionism by U.S. companies and their Congressional 
cohorts.”); see id. at 1292 (stating the adoption of certain measures such as the 
“Exon-Pill in order to avoid an unwanted takeover attempt”) (citing Paul I. 
Djurisic, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist National Security 
Legislation Susceptible to Abuse; 30 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 193 (1991)); Matthew C. 
Sullivan, CFIUS and Congress Reconsidered: Fire Alarms, Police Patrols and a New 
Oversight Regime, 17 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 199, 206 (2009) 
(providing evidence of examples where “members of Congress opposing on 
national security grounds proposed transactions that would reduce jobs or 
otherwise inflict economic harm on their constituents”).  However, these concerns 
may not be relevant with all transactions.  See also Sullivan, supra note 187, at 238 
(stating that “despite some concern that the Firstgold rejection represents a 
continuation of perceived U.S. hostility to Chinese investment, there is no 
evidence that CFIUS’s actual determination was based on considerations other 
than the unusual circumstances that this transaction presented.”). 
188  See Byrne, supra note 16, at 890 (“The risk of this lack of a definition of 
national security, of course, is that this gap could be exploited by a future 
protectionist-minded presidential administration to block transactions which 
properly should not be deemed to be national security threats.”) (citing Editorial, 
Ports of Gall, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2006), at A10); see Casselman, supra note 29  (“‘[I]t 
is in our interest and that of the global economy that China continue to progress 
toward becoming a more market-based, productive and dynamic economy . . . . 
For our part, it is essential that we do not put that outcome, or our future, at risk 
with a step back into protectionism.”) (quoting former Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan).  
189  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 130 (noting that “the increased interplay 
between the regulatory framework of countries seeking to attract foreign 
investment suggests that the CFIUS regime can have unintended international 
effects”). 
190  See id. at 126 (“If the United States is seen as using national security 
review to engage in protectionism, this could provoke a protectionist backlash in 
other parts of the world and hurt U.S. companies.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 
171, at 15 (explaining that “CFIUS’s substantive determination may also prove to 
be significant; although no evidence exists suggesting that the rejection [of 
Firstgold’s proposed transaction] should be interpreted as part of a broader 
protectionist shift in U.S. investment policy, the decision—barring further 
clarification from CFIUS agencies—could further escalate trade tensions.”). 
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that the governments could use for protectionist purposes under 
the guise of national security review.  Some prominent examples 
include major U.S. trade partners like Canada, Germany, China, 
and the European Union.191  Most notably, Article 12 of China’s 
2006 Provisions on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors installs a similar body to conduct national security 
reviews, leading to concerns that China will use this body for 
protectionist purposes.192  However, the scope of its national 
security review is “even murkier and less efficient”193 due to its 
“vague and as-yet-undefined process and lack of investor 
protections.”194  As a result, China could respond to CFIUS’s 
actions blocking Chinese investment in the United States, such as 
the recent prohibition of the Ralls Corp. investment,195 and prevent 
an even wider array of U.S. FDI in China.  Therefore, by providing 
clear guidelines regarding what transactions raise national security 
concerns, the United States could potentially increase FDI, calm 
political tensions, and create more opportunities for U.S. 
businesses to invest abroad. 
4.6. Case Studies 
Four recent case studies demonstrate the increasing recognition 
                                                     
191  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 130-31 (stating that “[i]n recent years, a 
number of jurisdictions have begun establishing CFIUS-style bodies or 
procedures, including major U.S. trade partners, such as China, Canada, 
Germany, and the European Union.”); see also Pudner, supra note 14, at 1297 (“In 
July 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for a European Union-wide 
national security review mechanism based on the CFIUS model.  In so 
recommending, Merkel was careful to advise against the French model in which 
‘a law defines strategic industries in a very broad way.’”) (citing Greg Hitt, U.S. 
Foreign-Investment Debate Goes Global: If Congress Sets Tighter Restrictions, Other 
Countries Could Enact Their Own Limits, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2006), at A4 and 
quoting Hugh Williamson, Merkel Seeks European-Wide Vetting of Foreign 
Acquisitions, FIN. TIMES (July 19, 2007), at 6).  
192  See Eric Jensen, Comment, Balancing Security and Growth: Defining National 
Security Review and Foreign Investment in China, 19 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 161, 162 
(2010) (stating that “[i]nvestors fear that developing economies, including China, 
are becoming increasingly protectionist under the guise of national security 
review.  Article 12 of China’s 2006 Provisions on Acquisition of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (2006 M&A Provisions) allows such review.”) 
(citing Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors, art. 12 (2006) (China)).  See generally id.  (discussing in detail 
China’s national security review process). 
193  Id. at 161.  
194  Id. at 162. 
195  See Section 4.6.1 (detailing the Ralls Corp. case). 
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of CFIUS as a barrier to FDI, the breadth of CFIUS’s national 
security review, and the costs this imposes on foreign direct 
investors, U.S. businesses, and the federal government.  These 
cases are Ralls Corp.’s attempted purchase of U.S. wind farms, the 
failed merger between BAE Systems Plc (“BAE”) and European 
Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co. (“EADS”), the congressional 
report recommending that CFIUS block all U.S. investments by 
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (“Huawei”) and ZTE Corporation 
(“ZTE”), and the approved acquisition of pork producer Smithfield 
Foods Inc. by China’s Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd.196  By 
discussing these examples, this paper is not stating an opinion as to 
whether the transactions should be permitted either under the 
current regulations or under the proposed revisions.  However, 
these cases highlight the costs of the current vagueness of the 
national security prong in the CFIUS regulations and how 
providing greater clarity could reduce costs for both businesses 
operating internationally and the Committee. 
4.6.1. Ralls Corp. 
President Obama’s order that Ralls Corporation divest its 
interest in four wind farm projects in Oregon in 2012 represents 
                                                     
196  While these proposed transactions represent the most significant 
examples of the Committee’s growing powers, many other notable transactions 
have recently undergone CFIUS review.  For example, the Committee forced the 
Indian company Polaris Financial Technology Ltd. to divest its 85.3% interest in 
IndenTrust Inc., a US company specializing in digital authentication services for 
secure cloud computing.  See GOODWIN PROCTER, Publication, CFIUS Invokes 
National Security in Ordering Indian Company to Divest Equity in U.S. Company (Sept. 
27, 2013), available at 
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-
Alert/2013/0927_CFIUS-Invokes-National-Security-in-Ordering-Indian-
Company-to-Divest-Equity-in-US-Company.aspx?article=1 (mentioning that 
Polaris Financial Technology Ltd. were ordered to divest 85.3% by CFIUS).  While 
Polaris was forced to divest, the nature of the services provided and the 
company’s provision of services to government agencies make the Committee’s 
action less surprising.  Another example is the approved acquisition of the 
Canadian company Nexen by CNOOC.  Michael J. De La Merced, Nexen Secures 
Approval of its Sale to Cnooc of China, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013, 9:10 AM), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/nexen-secures-u-s-approval-of-its-
sale-to-cnooc-of-china/.  An additional example is the sale of A123 Systems, a car 
battery manufacturer, to the Wanxiang Group.  See id.  Finally after the parties 
agreed to mitigation measures, CFIUS approved the acquisition of Sprint, the 
United States’ third largest mobile carrier, by the Japanese company Softbank.  See 
Ziad Haider, China Inc. and the CFIUS National Security Review, THE DIPLOMAT 
(Dec. 5, 2013), available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/china-inc-and-the-
cfius-national-security-review/1/.   
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perhaps the most striking example of the potential costs imposed 
by the array of transactions that CFIUS may deem national security 
threats.197  The order came after the Committee initiated a review, 
entered an interim order banning all further work on the project 
while the review was conducted, and even negotiated a mitigation 
agreement with Ralls Corp.198  After CFIUS determined that it was 
unable to reach a national security determination during the 
investigation, it referred the transaction to the President to either 
block or approve.  For the first time in twenty-two years,199 and just 
the second time ever,200 the President exercised his authority under 
the CFIUS regulations to block a transaction due to national 
security concerns.201 
Two executives of Sany Group Company, China’s largest 
machinery manufacturer,202 own Ralls Corp., thereby satisfying the 
                                                     
197  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the President 
issued an order to prevent the acquisition and ownership of four projects owned 
by Ralls Corp).  Ralls Corp. was required to remove all property within two 
weeks and to divest all interests within 90 days.  The order replaced an interim 
order banning further construction.  See Sara Forden, Chinese-Owned Company Sues 
Obama over Wind Farm Project, BUS. WK. (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-02/obama-bars-chinese-owned-
company-from-building-wind-farm.  The Ralls Corp. case is strikingly similar to 
the Firstgold transaction in which a Chinese company attempted to take over a 
mining facility located near Fallon Naval Air Station.  The proposed deal was 
withdrawn after CFIUS recommended that President Obama block the transaction 
but prior to an order from the President.  For a discussion of the Firstgold 
rejection, see generally Sullivan, supra note 171.  
198  See Forden, supra note 197 (explaining the timeline of the Ralls Corp. 
rejection).  For a discussion of the mitigation agreement, see Stan Abrams, Beating 
a Dead Horse: Chinese Investment and the U.S. National Excuse, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19, 
2012, 2:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/beating-a-dead-horse-chinese-
investment-and-the-us-national-security-excuse-2012-10 (discussing the 
mitigation agreement). 
199  See Order, supra note 148 (blocking MAMCO’s proposed acquisition); see 
also Forden, supra note 197 (stating that the Ralls Corp. order was the first time the 
President has blocked a transaction in 22 years). 
200  Forden, supra note 197; see also Siobhan Gorman & Juro Osawa, Huawei 
Fires Back at the U.S., WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443982904578044190738613734.h
tml?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories (stating that the Commerce Department had 
previously blocked Huawei from competing for a national wireless emergency 
network, citing national security concerns).  
201  See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 3 (showing chart demonstrating 
the percentages of transactions withdrawn, investigated, and decided by 
presidential decision). 
202  See Forden, supra note 197 (describing Ralls Corp.’s management 
structure). 
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foreign control prong of the CFIUS regulations.  However, it is 
unclear why the President decided that the project, which sought 
to place five Chinese-made wind turbines in each of the four 
locations,203 was a threat to national security.  Although the Obama 
Administration did not immediately provide an explanation of its 
decision to block the investment,204 the media coverage of the 
President’s order has offered two potential explanations.  First, the 
project’s locations were near the Naval Weapons Systems Training 
Facility, which is used for bombing, electronic combat, and drone 
training,205 and the wind farm’s proximity to this facility poses 
national security concerns.  Others claim that this cannot serve as a 
justification since there are other wind farms in the area.206  Second, 
others believe that President Obama blocked the transaction in an 
attempt to appear tough on China prior to the election.207  Such a 
motivation would reinforce the view that the breadth of the 
Committee’s national security determination could be used for 
politicized and protectionist reasons.208  Following the decision, 
many international businesspersons expressed concern over the 
                                                     
203   See China Syndrome: Obama Blocks Purchase of U.S. Wind Farms by Chinese 
Company, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWSWIRE (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20121002-obama-blocks-
purchase-of-u-s-wind-farms-by-chinese-company (noting that no reason was 
given as to what risk the farms posed). 
204   See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (pointing to the Ralls’ Chinese 
ownership and the sites’ vicinity to restricted US airspace).  The Treasury stated 
that this is not a sign of future policy vis-à-vis China.  See China Syndrome, supra 
note 203 (citing a statement denying that this was part of a coordinated strategy 
against China and that this was an isolated transaction).  This case is very similar 
to Firstgold, which was considered an exceptional case at the time.  See Sullivan, 
supra note 171, at 17–18 (stating that “[u]ltimately, fears that CFIUS officials’ 
emphasis on military installations disguised the committee’s true purposes 
remain wholly speculative” and that “Chairman Jaskowiak unequivocally 
characterized the transaction as ‘a very rare and unusual case,’ presenting its 
rejection as ‘a clear decision that had to be made.’”). 
205  For discussions of the sites location, see Naval Weapons Systems Training 
Facility Boardman, available at http://nwstfboardmaneis.com; see also Forden, 
supra note 197; see generally China Syndrome, supra note 203 (noting that planes fly 
as low as 200 feet and as fast as 300 miles per hour at the site).  
206  Tim Kia, a lawyer representing Ralls Corp., stated, “the President’s order 
is without justification, as scores of other wind turbines already operate in the 
area.”  China Syndrome, supra note 203.   
207   See id. (discussing accusations by Mitt Romney that President Obama is 
not being tough enough on China). 
208  See Section 4.1 (stating that adopting such measures could lead to a 
protectionist attitude). 
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implications of the decision,209 and Ralls Corp. filed suit alleging 
that they were denied property without due process of law.210 
However, this legal challenge is destined to fail, because the 
Executive receives an extremely high level of deference in matters 
of national security.211  In fact, the district court judge presiding 
over the case and many leading attorneys in the field have noted 
the dim prospects for Ralls Corp.’s legal challenge.212 
Regardless of the merits of Ralls Corp.’s legal claim or the 
reasoning behind the President’s decision, providing greater clarity 
concerning CFIUS’s national security review could have reduced 
the costs of this failed transaction.  First, whether the transaction 
would have been permitted under the modified regulations, Ralls 
Corp. could have used these regulations to evaluate the likelihood 
that the projects would be struck down during CFIUS review and 
decided whether to proceed by weighing the risk of CFIUS action 
against the potential value of the deal.  As a result, there would 
have been less uncertainty surrounding Ralls Corp.’s transaction, 
which could lead to increased profitability.213  Second, if Ralls 
Corp. determined that CFIUS was likely to initiate a review, they 
would be more likely to preemptively file a timely and complete 
notice instead of waiting for CFIUS to request a filing.  This would 
reduce the resources expended by both Ralls Corp. and CFIUS 
                                                     
209  Gorman & Osawa, supra note 200; Xinhua, US “National Security” Excuse 
Backfires, GLOBAL TIMES (Oct. 19, 2012, 2:15 AM), 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/739386.shtml (stating that "[i]nvestors may 
rethink their decisions if their assets are handled without legal basis or business 
logic."); see also Abrams, supra note 198 (noting that "[i]f Sany loses, many Chinese 
entrepreneurs may be more wary about future investment in the US.").  
210  See Forden, supra note 197 (explaining Ralls Corp.’s complaint against 
President Obama and CFIUS).  
211  See U.S. CONST. art. II (listing Executive Powers, including foreign policy 
and national defense); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (installing the famous and highly deferential two-step process 
for overturning executive agency decisions); see also Zaring, supra note 33, at 124–
25 (noting that “critics of executive power in national security matters tend to 
assume that, as a descriptive matter, the executive calls the shots” and “[j]udges 
have opined that ‘determinations regarding national security are matters that 
courts acknowledge are generally beyond their ken’ and that foreign affairs 
emergencies may require judicial deference even on matters of constitutional 
protection.”). 
212  Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the US, No. 
1:12CV01513 (D.D.C. filed on Sept. 12, 2012); see Forden, supra note 197 (describing 
the likely failure of the case and the judge’s initial order); see also China Syndrome, 
supra note 203 (stating that a suit was filed). 
213  See generally supra Section 4.3. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:11 AM 
1266 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:4 
during review.  Finally, had Ralls Corp. determined that CFIUS 
would block their investment, they would have called off the 
transaction, preventing the further waste of resources on a 
frivolous deal.  Consequently, clearer guidance on CFIUS’s 
national security review could have reduced the costs imposed 
upon both Ralls Corp. and CFIUS in pursuit of an unsuccessful 
transaction. 
4.6.2. BAE/EADS Merger 
The failed merger between BAE and EADS demonstrates the 
Committee’s increased power, how the number of transactions 
affected by CFIUS review exceeds the number reported annually, 
and how clear regulations can reduce costs for both the public and 
private sector.  Although BAE and EADS withdrew the proposed 
deal to create the world’s largest aero defense contractor without 
ever filing with CFIUS,214 both the structure of the deal and the 
parties’ actions in preparation for a filing signify their awareness 
that CFIUS approval would be required.  Moreover, the parties 
withdrew the proposed deal once it became apparent that the 
demands of the foreign governments involved in the deal could 
not be reconciled with the foreign control requirements of the 
CFIUS regulations.  The costs saved from this early withdrawal 
due to concerns regarding the “foreign control” prong demonstrate 
how similar clarity in the “national security” prong could reduce 
costs for foreign businesses and the Committee. 
The structure of the proposed deal deliberately limited foreign 
government-control in order to comply with the ten percent 
threshold in the foreign control prong of the CFIUS regulations.215  
From the beginning, the success of the deal was dependent on a 
determination by CFIUS that the transaction did not result in 
                                                     
214  See Gopal Ratnam & Sara Forden, BAE Said to Brief Pentagon on EADS 
Merger to Save Status, BUS. WK. (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-28/bae-said-to-brief-pentagon-
on-eads-merger-to-save-status (noting that the estimated revenue of the merged 
company of $94 billion would exceed the $76 billion revenue of Boeing Co.). 
215  See Andrea Rothman et al., EADS Said to Mull Deadline Move as BAE Talks 
Go into Weekend, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2012, 8:03 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-05/eads-struggles-to-meet-bae-
merger-deadline-amid-government-talks.html (discussing how French control of 
EADS would be reduced from 22.5% to 9% and would prevent Germany from 
purchasing another 7.5% of Dalminer). 
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significantly greater foreign control of the merged company.216  
Therefore, the parties took measures to ease U.S. government 
concerns of foreign control by issuing special shares,217 ring-
fencing certain defense activities,218 and operating under special 
security arrangements.219  In addition, both parties retained U.S. 
counsel and lobbyists to seek CFIUS approval, and BAE arranged a 
meeting with the Pentagon in an attempt to ease national security 
concerns stemming from the transaction.220  However, it soon 
became apparent that the French and German governments would 
not approve the structure of the deal because of the limits placed 
on their stakes in the merged company, and the parties withdrew 
the deal.221 
Although the parties never submitted the deal to the 
Committee or reviewed for national security concerns, the parties’ 
                                                     
216  See Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 (discussing the parties’ efforts to 
comply with the regulations due to their awareness of the necessity of CFIUS 
approval).  
217  See Steven M. Davidoff, The Many Complexities of an EADS-BAE Merger, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012, 2:47 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/the-many-complexities-of-any-eads-
bae-merger/ (discussing the issuance of “golden” or “special” shares to avoid 
foreign control while still retaining some authority over the merged company); see 
Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 (discussing the use of “golden” or “special” 
shares).  
218  The deal structure was flipped as to investment within the United States.  
Thus, instead of a 60-40% ownership arrangement between EADS and BAE, the 
parties agreed to give BAE 60% interest in US assets, because the US government 
is more trusting of BAE.  See Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 (explaining that the 
structure of the deals flips for U.S. interests in order to placate the Pentagon’s 
national security concerns); see also Davidoff, supra note 217 (noting the standard 
structure of the deal). 
219  See Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 (discussing attempts to arrange 
special security arrangements in order to avoid proxy agreements, placing US 
individuals on the board, and other similar arrangements).  
220  See id. (identifying the law firms and lobbyists named to counteract 
political pressures against the deal and to navigate the CFIUS review process).  
221  See, e.g., Marjorie Censer, BAE-EADS Merger Talks Collapse, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/bae-
eads-merger-talks-collapse/2012/10/10/e8a5f7aa-12dd-11e2-be82-
c3411b7680a9_story.html?hpid=z3 (explaining the collapse and withdrawal of the 
proposed deal); Véronique Guillermard & Yann Le Galès, Berlin Accusé D’Avoir 
Torpillé la Fusion EADS-BAE, LE FIGARO (Oct. 10, 2012), 
http://bourse.lefigaro.fr/indices-actions/actu-conseils/berlin-accuse-d-avoir-
torpille-la-fusion-eads-bae-292670 (discussing the French concerns of losing their 
stake in the merged company); see also Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 
(discussing the companies’ desire to avoid proxy agreements, placing U.S. 
individuals on the board, and other similar arrangements).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:11 AM 
1268 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:4 
actions demonstrate how clarity in the CFIUS regulations can 
reduce costs.  Since the “foreign control” prong of the regulations 
is clear, BAE and EADS were able to structure the proposed deal 
around the regulations and withdraw the deal once it became clear 
that the foreign governments’ demands could not be reconciled 
with the CFIUS regulations.  This prevented the use of resources 
both the companies and the Committee would have spent once the 
transaction was under CFIUS review.  Therefore, providing greater 
clarity as to the “national security” prong could similarly reduce 
costs.  Critics may respond that BAE and EADS deliberately 
contracted around the regulations and that international 
businesses would contract around the national security 
specifications, which would threaten U.S. interests.  However, by 
providing greater guidance while also retaining the President’s 
authority to block a transaction, parties would have greater clarity 
while retaining the government’s ability to protect U.S. national 
interests.222  Therefore, as clear standards regarding CFIUS’s 
definition of foreign control reduced costs in the failed merger 
between BAE and EADS, providing greater clarity as to the scope 
of the Committee’s national security review could reduce costs in 
future transactions without sacrificing U.S. national security. 
4.6.3. Huawei & ZTE 
Another recent demonstration of the Committee’s increasing 
powers and expanding influence is the recent congressional report 
labeling Huawei and ZTE as national security threats that CFIUS 
should prevent from investing in the United States.223  The report 
recommends labeling both companies, which sell 
telecommunications equipment used for the operation of wireless 
networks, as arms of the Chinese government seeking to steal U.S. 
intellectual property and to spy on the United States.224  
                                                     
222  See generally infra Section 5. 
223 See generally CHAIRMAN MIKE ROGERS & RANKING MEMBER C.A. DUTCH 
RUPPERSBERGER OF THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH 
CONG., INVESTIGATIVE REP. ON THE U.S. NAT’L SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE 
TELECOMMS. COS. HUAWEI AND ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012), available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Hu
awei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf (noting the threat to 
national security and stating "Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted to be free of 
foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to 
our systems."). 
224  See id. at 12, 2 (asserting that the companies’ evasive actions “only 
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Specifically, there is concern that these technologies could be used 
to intercept communications or launch a cyberattack,225 and the 
report notes China’s history of economic espionage.226  As a result, 
the report states that CFIUS “must block acquisitions, takeovers, or 
mergers involving Huawei and ZTE given the threat to U.S. 
national security interests,” and “[l]egislative proposals seeking to 
expand CFIUS to include purchasing agreements should receive 
thorough consideration by relevant Congressional committees.”227 
Although the Committee has never officially blocked a 
transaction involving either company, CFIUS has previously 
issued an advisory opinion denying FDI by Huawei.228  Huawei, in 
particular, has a checkered history with the Committee stemming 
from its attempted acquisition of the U.S.-based firm 3Com in 
2007–2008.229  Due to these concerns, the Committee should likely 
block FDI by Huawei in the United States; however, these 
objectives could be accomplished more effectively by providing 
more clarity regarding the Committee’s national security 
evaluation.  The highly public nature of this report led to 
immediate criticisms that the action was political and 
                                                     
heighten[ed] concerns about Chinese government control over these firms and 
their operations” and noting that the companies seek “to control the market for 
sensitive equipment and infrastructure that could be used for spying and other 
malicious purposes”). 
225  See id. at iv (Executive Summary) (stating that “the opportunity exists for 
further economic and foreign espionage by a foreign nation-state already known 
to be a major perpetrator of cyber espionage”). 
226  See id. (remarking that “the opportunity exists for further economic and 
foreign espionage by a foreign nation-state already known to be a major 
perpetrator of cyber espionage”). 
227  Id. 
228 Id. at 12-43; Michael S. Schmidt, U.S. Panel Cites Risks in Chinese Equipment, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/us/us-panel-
calls-huawei-and-zte-national-security-threat.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&hp 
(detailing the report’s findings and noting responses). 
229  See Sullivan, supra note 187, at 228–29 (“The actions of the Chinese 
corporation Huawei during 2007 and 2008 provide a stark counterexample for 
other firms of how not to approach the CFIUS process.  Their attempt to acquire 
the U.S.-based firm 3Com came one year after a cyber attack on the Pentagon, 
believed to have originated in China.  Still, Huawei executives struck an 
uncooperative tone, maintaining that the size of their investment meant it did not 
warrant governmental scrutiny.  Despite the existence of congressional resistance 
to the deal, which was ultimately abandoned, several aspects of the 3Com-
Huawei transaction indicate that the deal would have failed to win CFIUS 
approval without a dramatic restructuring.”).  Of particular concern was the 
founder’s history as a People’s Liberation Army officer and the company’s close 
ties with Chinese military. 
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protectionist.230  Indeed, scholars have warned that greater 
congressional involvement in the CFIUS review process will lead 
to protectionism, foreign policy dilemmas, and even Constitutional 
issues.231  Others, however, think the Committee is sufficiently 
insulated from congressional pressure.232  Although there is truth 
to both of these positions, providing clearer guidance regarding 
the national security prong in the CFIUS regulations would 
eliminate some of the concerns of polarization and protectionism 
while maintaining a limited oversight role for Congress, thereby 
reducing the costs the regulations impose on international 
businesses. 
                                                     
230  See, e.g., Gorman & Osawa, supra note 200 (noting the negative responses 
following the report’s publication); see also Press Release from Ken Hu, Deputy 
Chairman of Huawei Technologies, Chairman of Huawei USA, Huawei Open 
Letter (Feb. 25, 2011, 00:00 AM), available at http://www.huawei.com/en/about-
huawei/newsroom/press-release/hw-092875-huaweiopenletter.htm (responding 
to the company being labeled as a threat to U.S. national security); see also Xinhua, 
supra note 209 (criticizing U.S. claims of security threats as baseless); Abrams, 
supra note 198 (criticizing U.S. claims of national security concerns as an excuse 
for other motivations). 
231  See Byrne, supra note 16, at 849 (“Greater Congressional involvement in 
the CFIUS review process would politicize the process in a manner that would 
change Exon-Florio from a national security tool to a protectionist tool and would 
raise serious constitutional and policy concerns.”); see also Zaring, supra note 33, at 
103 (“The actual practice of the Committee shows that, although apparently a 
hurdle that foreign acquirers rather fear, it rarely interferes with foreign 
acquisitions—and when it does interfere, it does so in a pro forma manner.  
CFIUS’s minute blockage record and its relatively modest imposition of 
conditions on acquirers, when considered alongside Congress’s increasingly 
important role in vetting CFIUS acquisitions, bolster the Congress-not-the-
president account of CFIUS that is proffered here.”). 
232 See Zaring, supra note 33, at 101 (“In this way, Congress has turned CFIUS, 
an agency at the heart of implementing the president’s policies on national 
security, into an outfit that in many ways serves and is closely supervised by the 
legislature.  In a world where scholars bemoan the lack of oversight of the 
executive’s national security determinations by the coordinate branches, CFIUS 
may offer a way forward.”); id. at 120 (“Accordingly, while CFIUS is not a 
nonexistent obstacle for foreign acquisition, it is Congress, sitting in review of the 
Committee that really drives American policy in this area.”); see also Byrne, supra 
note 16, at 891 (“CFIUS at present operates in an environment that is usually 
isolated from political concerns, thus preserving the balance between national 
security and an open investment policy.”); see also Pudner, supra note 14, at 1290 
(“These reporting requirements add an appropriate level of Congressional 
scrutiny by requiring notice and explanations of cleared transactions, but 
importantly, and appropriately, only so require after the CFIUS process has run 
its course, therefore insulating the CFIUS procedure from excessive Congressional 
pressures.”). 
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4.6.4. Smithfield Foods, Inc. 
Although CFIUS ultimately approved the transaction, the 
Committee’s review of Shuanghui International Holdings 
Limited’s (Shuanghui”) acquisition of Smithfield Foods, Inc. 
(“Smithfield”) represents the final notable example of the 
Committee’s expanding national security review.  Shuanghui, a 
Hong-Kong based company focusing on the food and logistics 
sectors, including China’s largest meat processor, agreed to acquire 
Smithfield, a Virginia-based company and the largest pork 
producer in the world in May 2013 for $4.72 billion.233  Aware of 
the Committee’s increasing authority, the parties conditioned 
closing on CFIUS approval and submitted a voluntary notice to the 
Committee in June 2013.234  After conducting a 75-day review, 
CFIUS approved the transaction without requiring any material 
mitigation measures.235 
The Committee’s scrutiny of the transaction marked a new 
addition to the national security review:  threats to the U.S. food 
supply.236  Both Congress and investors warned of the national 
security risks of allowing Chinese control of a major U.S. food 
processor, and other concerns centered around U.S. jobs, food 
prices, retaliatory restrictions by the Chinese government, and 
possibly whether Smithfield facilities were near military bases or 
other sensitive locations.237  Senate Finance Committee Chairman 
                                                     
233  SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, Publication, Shuanghui International Receives 
CFIUS Clearance for its Purchase of Smithfield Foods (Sept. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/e2199a8c-3d7a-4c17-aad5-
553b0b0cc15d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d600e67e-ff8b-4e0d-9049-
55f01abbb31c/SC_Publication_Shuanghui_International_Receives_CFIUS_Cleara
nce_for_its_Purchase_of_Smithfield_Foods.pdf; Shruit Date Singh & Bradley 
Olson, Smithfield Receives U.S. Approval for Biggest Chinese Takeover, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 6, 2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-09-
06/smithfield-receives-u-s-regulator-approval-for-shuanghui-deal.html.  
234   SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 233, at 2. 
235  Id. (noting that “notice of the clearance was filed in Smithfield’s Securities 
and Exchange Commission proxy statement in connection with the upcoming 
shareholder vote to approve the transaction”).  
236  See generally Doug Guthrie, CFIUS: Often Misunderstood and Maligned, 
FORBES (Dec. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougguthrie/2013/12/20/cfius-often-
misunderstood-and-maligned/print (noting CFIUS's review of the Smithfield 
merger was the first involving concerns over the national food supply).  
237  See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 233 (highlighting the various 
US concerns arising from the acquisition of Smithfield by Shuanghui); Singh & 
Olson, supra note 233 (noting that CFIUS might have considered the proximity of 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:11 AM 
1272 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:4 
Max Baucus, Senator Orrin Hatch, and Senator Debbie Stabenow 
all spoke out publicly against the deal.238  In addition, at least two 
shareholders advocated for the breakup of Smithfield.239 
Despite the deal’s ultimate approval, the Smithfield acquisition 
demonstrates how far the Committee’s national security review 
has expanded beyond what investors view as traditional national 
security domains.  The deal’s approval can likely be largely 
attributed to the parties’ proactive filing and cooperative efforts. 
However, most investors would not anticipate such transactions 
requiring CFIUS approval, increasing uncertainty and leading to 
prolonged reviews, and this broadening of national security review 
further increases the likelihood of retaliatory measures. 
These case studies illustrate some of the immeasurable costs 
associated with the current form of the national security review 
process and offer insights into how providing greater clarity 
regarding CFIUS’s national security review could encourage FDI 
while still protecting U.S. national security.  These immeasurable 
costs come in the form of delay and uncertainty, increased 
Committee review costs, and retaliatory measures, which 
collectively demonstrate the potential economic benefits of 
providing greater clarity regarding CFIUS’s review. 
5. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Due to the significant costs imposed on both private businesses 
and the Committee by the failure to provide clear guidance 
regarding the Committee’s national security review, the CFIUS 
regulations should be revised to provide greater clarity to those 
seeking to invest in the United States.240  This does not necessarily 
mean that the Committee’s power to review national security 
threats raised by transactions must be weakened.241  In fact, 
                                                     
Smithfield’s facilities to the military bases and the impact of the acquisition on the 
US food-supply chain). 
238  See Guthrie, supra note 236 (noting that Senator Debbie Stabenow 
questioned the economic motivation of the acquisition); Singh & Olson, supra note 
233 (highlighting that Senator Orrin Hatch urged scrutiny of the acquisition).  
 239  Singh & Olson, supra note 233. 
      240     Authority to define national security or adjust the national security 
factors exists.  See Shearer, supra note 3, at 1733 (“Given this discretion, future 
administrations have the ability, without rewriting the statute or the regulations, 
to define the ‘national security’ standard to encompass economic and industrial 
policy concerns.”).  
241  See Weimar, supra note 2, at 663 (“[W]hile practitioners have sought to 
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revising the national security definition could make the 
Committee’s national security review even stronger,242 while also 
stimulating FDI in the United States through increased clarity.  
This has led scholars to propose a variety of modifications to the 
CFIUS regulations.243  While the proposals have merit, they are 
either too limited in application, or fail to strike the proper balance 
between encouraging FDI and maintaining the Committee’s 
discretion in protecting U.S. national security interests. 
This paper proposes modifying the CFIUS regulations 
pertaining to national security in three significant ways:  (1) the 
Committee should publish a list of specific industries and 
technologies, the acquisition of which is presumed to raise national 
security concerns; (2) the Committee should publish charts of 
acquiring countries and companies presumed to be a national 
security risk; and (3) the Committee should clarify the application 
of these regulations by providing more examples to which 
companies can compare their proposed transactions.  Although 
this may seem like a daunting task, similar publications are 
                                                     
explain what types of transactions trigger CFIUS review, few have stepped back 
to ask what types of transactions should lead to such scrutiny and what form such 
scrutiny should take.”). 
242  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 129 (“[T]he definition of ‘national security’ 
was sometimes interpreted too narrowly and the list of factors used to evaluate 
national security threats was viewed as too vague.”). 
243  Some scholars have provided definitions for national security.  See Byrne, 
supra note 16, at 894–910 (outlining proposal that will: “(1) give Congress the 
ability to pass a joint resolution reversing the president’s decisions under the 
statute; (2) add economic security as a touchstone for CFIUS review; (3) enhance 
CFIUS’s reporting requirements to Congress; and (4) shift the chairmanship of 
CFIUS from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Defense or 
Homeland Security”); Jason Cox, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment After the 
Dubai Ports Controversy: Has the U.S. Government Finally Figured Out How to Balance 
Foreign Threats to National Security Without Alienating Foreign Companies?, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 293, 311-14 (2009) (making the following recommendations: (1) removal of 
the mandatory investigation of foreign government-controlled transactions; (2) 
creation of a separate committee to review all FDI transactions and initiate CFIUS 
reviews; (3) rework the evergreen provision to only include intentional fraud by 
the parties to the covered transaction; and (4) more secrecy in the CFIUS process); 
Yiheng Feng, Note, ”We Wouldn’t Transfer Title to the Devil”: Consequences of the 
Congressional Politicization of Foreign Direct Investment on National Security Grounds, 
42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 253, 300-09 (2010) (recommending implementation of a 
more robust mitigation system and regulatory parity with the investing nation 
when conducting national security reviews); Zaring, supra note 33, at 130 (stating 
that some “have produced their own cautious judgments on what might 
constitute national security”).  For a discussion of the potential application of 
golden shares to resolve matters of foreign government control, see generally 
Byrne, supra note 16. 
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available for export control regimes and could be used as 
guidelines for CFIUS.  In making these recommendations, this 
paper draws considerably from these export regulations, which 
have successfully balanced the encouragement of FDI and the 
protection of national security interests.244 
One may note that these recommendations are similar to those 
rejected at the passage of FINSA when the Committee denied 
requests to include lists of sectors, technologies, and countries 
deemed to be national security risks.245  However, there are certain 
key considerations and differences that make these changes a 
suitable remedy.  First, when rejecting these recommendations, 
CFIUS had not yet published the Guidance or the annual report.  
This is significant, because the Guidance and the annual report 
have not provided the anticipated or necessary clarity regarding 
the Committee’s national security evaluation.  Second, the scope 
and financial implications of CFIUS’s national security review 
under FINSA were not yet understood.  In the years since FINSA’s 
passage, CFIUS’s powers have grown, and parties have become 
increasingly concerned about the broad powers of this once-
toothless regulatory committee.246 
Most importantly, the lists, charts, and examples proposed in 
this paper will only create the presumption that the transaction 
will be considered a national security threat.  Therefore, discretion 
over national security determinations would remain with CFIUS 
and the President, allowing the flexibility to respond to the 
continuously evolving nature of national security, while still 
permitting foreign direct investors to make more accurate ex ante 
determinations of whether their transactions will be subject to a 
national security evaluation.  Some may argue that leaving final 
discretion with the Committee and the President would permit the 
continued blocking of transactions for political and other reasons.  
However, rooting these decisions by the Committee and the 
President in concrete lists and charts would decrease the likelihood 
of this occurring.  Parties would gain a better understanding of 
why transactions were denied, because CFIUS or the President 
                                                     
244  Although there have been criticisms of the export regulations, they are 
primarily based on the extraterritorial application of the laws. 
245  See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 133 (describing the Committee’s decision 
not to list countries). 
      246    See generally supra Section 3.4 (discussing the expansion of CFIUS’s 
powers).  
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would be required to either link the decision to noncompliance 
with the lists and charts provided or make a discretionary 
determination.  In addition, they would then be required to 
publish redacted reports on these discretionary determinations to 
eliminate unilateral decisions not rooted in genuine national 
security threats.  This would increase the accountability of CFIUS 
and the President, because they would no longer be able to rely on 
vague factors and would be forced to point to clear justifications 
for blocking transactions.  Therefore, parties would be able to make 
more accurate business decisions based on their ability to 
determine whether their transaction is subject to review, but the 
Committee would maintain its ultimate authority to block 
transactions for legitimate national security reasons. 
5.1. Export Controls 
The United States already has abundant experience in labeling 
certain industries and technologies as national security threats, as 
well as labeling trading with certain countries and companies as a 
national security risk.  Most notably, the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 (EAA)247 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
(AECA)248 both regulate U.S. exports involving certain industries 
and technologies for national security reasons.  In addition, both 
the EAA and AECA provide a chart or list of countries to which 
certain exports are prohibited and where certain countries are 
presumed to be national security threats.  The international 
community has also implemented similarly specific regimes,249 
                                                     
247  See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–72 (1979) 
(describing the normalized extension of the EAA by Presidents).  The EAA was 
implemented by Export Control Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–74 (1979).  When 
the EAA expired in 1994, the President exercised his powers under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) and extended 
the EAA by passing Exec. Order No. 12924, 59 Fed. Reg. 206 (1994).  Every 
president since has continued to extend the EAA in this manner.  
248  See Arms Export Control, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2765 (1976) (listing the 
relevant industries for which there are national security threats); The United 
States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. 121 (listing technologies with defense 
applications).  The AECA was implemented by the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) and is further governed by TAAs and MLAs. 
249  The Wassenaar Arrangement to which 42 countries, including the United 
States, promotes “transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of 
conventional arms and dual-use goods.”  It includes extremely detailed lists of 
nine categories of dual-use goods, a sensitive list, a very sensitive list, and a 
munitions list.  See Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, The Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
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demonstrating both the feasibility and international acceptance of 
such restrictions.  Using the effective balance accomplished by 
these regulations as a guide, CFIUS could publish a list of 
industries and technologies for which acquisition would be 
presumed to be a threat to national security, which could then be 
cross-referenced with a chart of countries and companies 
presumed to threaten national security when investing in the 
United States.  Publishing these lists and charts would improve the 
transparency of CFIUS review while preserving CFIUS’s robust 
authority to block transactions threatening national security. 
The EAA grants the President authority to regulate the export 
and re-export of “dual-use” items, meaning items that have both 
commercial and military applications, for reasons of national 
security, foreign policy, and short supply.250  Parties seeking to 
export items covered by the Export Administration Regulations 
(EAR), which implement the EAA regulations, must obtain a 
license from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).251  BIS 
publishes the Commerce Control List (CCL), which includes ten 
categories of items, each containing particular items and 
specifications that are subject to regulation under the EAA.252  
                                                     
Technologies (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2012/Basic%20Documents%20201
2.pdf (showing the origins of the Arrangement and providing information for 
where to find the various lists mentioned above).  
250  See Export Administration Act, supra note 247, at pmbl. (discussing the 
president’s power under the Export Administration Act).  The President names 
the items to the list and has authority to establish President’s Technology Export 
Council and Export Control Advisory Committees.  Some claim the President’s 
powers over export control extend too far.  See Zaring, supra note 33, at 131 
(“Under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (“EAA”), the President has the 
‘ability to block most exports to certain nations or to control the shipment of 
specific technologies and goods to any country.  This power provides the 
President with an effective weapon for economic warfare, one he can use 
unhindered.’  The justification for the President’s responsibility here also lies in 
his control over national security.”).  However, this is still preferable, because the 
lists are published in advance so parties are not caught off guard.  
251  See Export Administration Act, supra note 247 (explaining that licenses 
must be obtained from BIS for items covered under EAR).  
252 See Commerce Control List, 15 C.F.R. § 738.2 (2013) (listing the following 
ten categories: (0) Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Equipment; (1) Special 
Materials and Related Equipment; Chemicals, ‘Microorganisms’ and Toxins; (2) 
Materials Processing; (3) Electronics; (4) Computers; (5) Telecommunications and 
Information Security; (6) Lasers and Sensors; (7) Navigation and Avionics; (8) 
Marine; and (9) Aerospace and Propulsion).  These categories contain extremely 
specific subcategories listing items based on sizes, temperatures, and other details.  
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Moreover, every Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 
explains why the EAA limits the export of that item.253  After 
determining if their export appears on the CCL, parties look to the 
country chart, which clearly illustrates what countries may not 
receive the export based on the reasons for which the item’s export 
is restricted.  Therefore, exporters can clearly determine whether 
they are required to acquire a license in order to export specific 
items to specific countries, eliminating uncertainty and promoting 
cross-border transactions. 
The AECA similarly limits the export and re-export of certain 
items, but the AECA only restricts items with defense applications.  
The Department of State administers the AECA under the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),254 which contains 
the highly detailed United States Munitions List (USML).255  Items 
appearing on the USML are subject to the prohibition of export, 
and the President is required to report to Congress if he becomes 
aware of a potential violation.256  Similarly to the CCL, this list is 
updated over time in a variety of sources to keep pace with 
changes in available technologies and national security threats.257  
In addition, exports of defense items to certain countries, namely 
Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan, are subject to 
sanctions.258  The AECA provides another example to emulate, 
because the listing of industries, technologies, and countries can 
effectively be presumed to raise national security concerns. 
Despite the presence of these export examples for similar 
listing mechanisms pertaining to FDI, CFIUS elected to eschew 
                                                     
253  See Commerce Control List, 31 C.F.R. § 738.2 (1996) and § 742 (1996) 
(listing the following ECCN classification: Anti-Terrorism (AT), Chemical and 
Biological Weapons (CB), Crime Control (CC), Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CW), Encryption Items (EI), Firearms Convention (FC), Missile Technology (MT), 
National Security (NS), Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP), Regional Stability (RS), 
Short Supply (SS), United Nations Embargo (UN), Significant Items (SI), and 
Surreptitious Listening (SL)).  
254  See The United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1976) Subchapter M 
(containing ITAR regulations). 
255  See 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1976) (containing USML).  
256  See id. at Subchapter M (describing the nature of the USML restrictions 
and the obligations of the President).  
257  The BIS is responsible for updating the list, which is amended in the 
Federal Register.  The Defense Trade News published by the Department of 
State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs further clarifies the list. 
258  See Foreign Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008) (listing the 
various countries for which defense items are subject to sanctions).  
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these successful models in favor of the vague and discretionary 
system currently in place.  Instead, parties simply report if the U.S. 
business being acquired produces or trades in items subject to 
these or other similar regulations.259  However, since there is no 
indication as to the weight this factor will carry relative to other 
vague factors in the CFIUS regulations, the regulations’ discussion 
of these export regimes provides only extremely limited guidance 
instead of the concrete determinations provided to exporters 
applying those regimes. 
5.2. Presumed Threats:  Industries and Technologies 
Using these export control regimes and the resources CFIUS 
already allocates to its annual evaluations of whether there is a 
coordinated foreign strategy to acquire U.S. critical technologies, 
CFIUS should implement a list of industries and technologies 
presumed to threaten national security.  As noted above, the EAA 
already breaks down items into categories and lists of specific 
items subject to export restrictions based on the country to which 
the item is destined.  Certain categories260 receive near-blanket 
restrictions.  Therefore, should the Committee so choose, it could 
label FDI in U.S. businesses operating in certain high-threat 
industries, such as nuclear energy, as always presumed to threaten 
national security.  As a result, parties seeking to invest in U.S. 
businesses operating in these industries would know that their 
transaction would be subject to CFIUS review and potential delay 
or cancellation.  This would both benefit the investors through 
greater clarity and expedite the review process by increasing early 
filings. 
Since only select high-threat industries would be subject to the 
presumption of a national security threat, the list of technologies of 
the U.S. business being acquired would be of greater importance.  
As noted above, FINSA added the potential national security-
related effects on critical infrastructure and critical technologies to 
CFIUS’s national security review.  However, CFIUS evaluates 
effects on critical infrastructure on a case-by-case basis, noting only 
that its definition “turns on the national security effects of any 
                                                     
259  See Fed Reg., supra note 1, at 70725 (noting reporting requirements for 
items subject to export control). 
260  For example, CB 1 (Chemical and biological weapons), NS 1 (National 
Security), and MT 1 (missile technology) may not be exported to most countries 
without a license.  
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incapacity or destruction . . . over which a foreign person would 
have control as a result of a covered transaction.”261  The 
regulations define critical technologies as defense articles and 
services contained in the USML, certain categories of items from 
the CCL, specific nuclear equipment, and select agents and 
toxins.262  CFIUS also assesses critical technologies in conjunction 
with its evaluation of whether there is a targeted effort to acquire 
U.S. critical technologies.  In its annual report, the Committee notes 
that, “[t]here is no single source that lists all U.S. critical technology 
companies acquired by foreign persons,” requiring the 
contributing export control agencies to use “a combination of 
publicly available information, non-public data on M&A 
transactions that CFIUS reviewed, and their own internal records 
to identify the U.S. critical technology companies . . . .”263  
Therefore, CFIUS already evaluates critical technologies but does 
not publish which of these technologies are considered national 
security risks in any publicly available source.  As a result, the 
Committee would only need to expend a marginal amount of 
resources in order to produce such a list. 
If the Committee published this information in public lists, it 
would increase the transparency of the Committee’s national 
security evaluation for foreign direct investors, rather than 
perpetuating the ambiguity of the current reliance on the vague 
FINSA §721(f) factors.  Since CFIUS elected not to rely on these 
export lists under FINSA, it may not wish to subject all covered 
transactions involving these technologies to Committee review.  If 
this is the case, CFIUS could trim the list down to a more select 
number of technologies and limit restrictions of less threatening 
dual-use technologies to countries viewed as the greatest threats to 
the United States.264  The important feature is creating a database 
                                                     
261  Fed. Reg, supra note 1, at 70708. 
262  See 31 C.F.R. § 209 (1976) (listing the sources from which the Committee 
draws lists of critical technologies); Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 246 
(“The statutory definition of critical technologies, however, is expanded upon to 
incorporate by reference the definitions from various existing regulatory regimes 
that deal with export, trade, or handling of sensitive goods, technologies, and 
services.”). 
263  This included evaluations by the Department of State under ITAR, 
Commerce under EAR and toxin restrictions, and Energy.  See ANNUAL REPORT 
2010, supra note 5, at 36.  In total, 32 agencies and entities contributed to the critical 
technologies section.  For a complete list of the agencies and entities, see id. at 39 
(listing the entities).  
264  Admittedly, this will likely open the process to intense lobbying as 
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that allows parties to determine whether their transaction is subject 
to a national security evaluation prior to completing that 
transaction.  Similarly to the CCL and USML, the President and his 
designated agencies could continuously update this list; however, 
it needs to be made available for consultation prior to completing 
the transaction in order to reduce unexpected delays and 
uncertainty.  This will also reduce other indirect costs, such as 
retaliatory measures and review costs for the Committee, by 
increasing the transparency of the national security evaluation. 
5.3. Presumed Threats:  Countries and Companies 
Similarly to export control regimes, for those industries and 
technologies not subject to the blanket presumption of threatening 
national security, CFIUS should publish a chart of countries and 
companies to be consulted in conjunction with the industries and 
technologies list.  This chart could also include blanket 
presumptions of national security risks for select countries, such as 
state sponsors of terrorism, and certain companies deemed to be 
puppets of foreign governments threatening U.S. national security 
interests.  Moreover, this chart could also be constructed fairly 
easily based on the export models and the Committee’s annual 
evaluation of investors by countries complying with the boycott of 
Israel, or by countries that do not ban foreign terrorist 
organizations.265 
Since these charts include valuable trade partners, such as 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, CFIUS may wish to 
limit the countries subject to this presumption to certain high-
threat industries and technologies.  In addition, China is both 
commonly viewed as a threat to U.S. national security and as a 
valuable trade partner.  For such situations, this chart of countries 
should be consulted in conjunction with the list of industries and 
technologies.  The key distinction is that instead of publishing a 
vague evaluation of investments from these countries at the 
conclusion of each year, CFIUS should make a consultable chart 
                                                     
certain industries seek to avoid being included in the list.  However, the fact that 
similar lists have been implemented in the realm of exports demonstrates the 
feasibility of such a process. 
265  See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 30, 31 (listing Algeria, Iraq, Iran, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen as countries that comply with the boycott of Israel and 
Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela as countries that do not 
ban terrorist organizations). 
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available to parties in real time. 
Some may note the potential for diplomatic conflicts stemming 
from countries being placed on this chart, and the potential for 
retaliatory measures; however, these risks would be overstated for 
a variety of reasons.  First, the chart would only signify the 
presumption that FDI from that country posed a national security 
risk.  Parties believing that their transaction did not in fact pose 
these risks would be aware of this presumption and could file a 
notice with the Committee seeking to prove their transaction was 
harmless.  Second, the chart would include every country in the 
world, like the country chart published under the EAR, and would 
draw distinctions based primarily on the industries and 
technologies.  Thus, instead of banning all investment from that 
country, bans would be limited to certain defense articles and dual-
use items, and be further restricted based on the specific national 
security risks these items pose if acquired by that particular 
country, which would limit the potential “shunning” effect and 
resulting likelihood of retaliatory measures.  Third, similar 
designations exist in even stricter form through both sanction 
regimes and export control regimes, reducing the potential 
backlash likely to result when countries are first determined to 
threaten U.S. national security interests.  Finally, countries largely 
reliant on revenues generated via FDI in the United States may 
seek to increase their conformity with the regulations and to 
pursue diplomatic solutions.  Therefore, the benefits of 
transparency outweigh the costs of publishing a chart of 
threatening countries. 
In addition, the Committee should consider publishing a chart 
of companies whose investment is presumed to threaten U.S. 
national security.  These designations are likely to be based on the 
belief that the company operates as a puppet of a foreign 
government deemed to be a national security risk.  The most 
notable examples of companies that may receive such a 
designation are Huawei and ZTE, which have essentially already 
been so designated.266  By labeling a company, as opposed to a 
country, as a presumed threat, CFIUS could narrowly tailor its 
restrictions in instances where it does not wish to restrict all 
investment from a particular country in that industry or 
technology but has determined that a particular company is an arm 
                                                     
266  See supra Section 4.6.3 (discussing further the process by which Huawei 
and ZTE were labeled as national security threats).  
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of a foreign government. 
Publishing sources for industries, technologies, countries, and 
companies presumed to raise national security concerns could 
reduce the costs of delay and uncertainty to foreign direct 
investors, the Committee’s own review costs, and limit indirect 
costs like retaliatory measures, because it would be clear which 
transactions may raise national security concerns in the vast 
majority of situations.  However, in order to maintain robust 
national security protections, the CFIUS regulations should 
preserve the President’s ultimate authority to block transactions 
but limit it to discretionary circumstances not covered by the 
sources of presumed national security threats. 
5.4. Examples for Discretionary Decisions 
The CFIUS regulations provide only limited examples of how 
they are to be applied, particularly for national security 
evaluations.267  For instance, there are nine examples under the 
“control” heading, and twenty-seven under the “covered 
transaction” heading but none related specifically to the 
application of the national security factors.268  In addition, CFIUS 
has been reluctant to comply with requests to publish redacted 
versions of covered transactions in the annual reports and even 
reports to Congress,269 which may be an effort to avoid the cost and 
burden of publishing such reports.  However, by publishing these 
lists and charts, CFIUS could limit the number of reports required 
to situations where CFIUS exercises its discretionary authority to 
allow a transaction that was presumed to threaten national security 
or to situations where the President exercises his discretionary 
                                                     
267  Should this proposal be rejected, the Committee should consider 
publishing examples of national security concerns for consultation by foreign 
direct investors.  This would increase the certainty surrounding FDI, though not 
to the same extent as publishing lists of presumed national security threats. 
268  See 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (2008); 31 C.F.R. § 800.301 (2008) (showing how the 
few examples given do not include an application of the national security factors). 
This stems from CFIUS’s desire to maintain a case-by-case evaluation of national 
security concerns.   
269  See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70714 (rejecting a commenter’s request that 
reports on cases be made public, because “the national security effects of covered 
transactions is based on, among other things, sensitive business information 
submitted by the parties and classified U.S. Government information”); Sullivan, 
supra note 187, at 235 (noting companies are concerned about their ability to 
maintain the confidentiality of their information and “some observers maintaining 
that Congress should receive only aggregate data”).  
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authority to block a transaction not presumed to threaten national 
security. 
Allowing the Committee and the President to maintain this 
discretionary authority would admittedly decrease the overall 
certainty these proposed revisions seek to create; however, this 
uncertainty will be extremely limited and balance the Committee’s 
authority to protect national security interests.  First, should the 
Committee decide to allow a transaction presumed to threaten 
national security based on the lists and charts, this will actually 
benefit the parties by allowing the transaction to proceed without 
delay.  Second, the President’s powers to block a transaction have 
not been a major problem.  As noted, the President has only 
exercised this power twice in the history of the Committee.  
Although this could increase should the regulations be revised, it is 
unlikely to be exercised too frequently because of the improved 
accountability generated by the lists and charts of presumed 
threats.  Therefore, this discretionary authority can be maintained 
without overly diminishing the certainty surrounding FDI. 
Moreover, the regulations should require CFIUS to publish 
redacted reports on the transactions where the Committee or the 
President exercised their discretionary authority, which would 
further reduce the uncertainty generated by preserving this 
discretionary authority.  Foreign direct investors’ concerns over 
confidentiality would also be minimal, both because the reports 
would be redacted and because they would only be published in 
the rare event that this discretionary authority was exercised.  
Therefore, CFIUS can maintain robust authority to protect national 
security interests, while significantly reducing the net uncertainty 
surrounding their national security evaluations and without 
raising significant confidentiality concerns. 
6. CONCLUSION 
With the passage of FINSA, CFIUS has transitioned from a 
once-toothless entity to a powerful body with immense authority 
to prevent FDI for national security reasons.  Due to the vagueness 
of the national security factors and the lack of transparency as to 
how they are applied, investors are left with little clarity as to 
whether their transaction may raise national security concerns.   
This uncertainty imposes significant costs on foreign direct 
investors, U.S. businesses, and the Committee itself.  Although 
these costs have not been effectively measured, they are 
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undoubtedly substantial due to delays and uncertainty for 
businesses, retaliatory measures, and increased review costs for the 
Committee.  Moreover, these costs are likely to increase as the 
global economy recovers, leading to increased cross-border 
investments, and as both CFIUS and the President continue to 
expand the application of their respective powers under the CFIUS 
regulations.  Commenters and scholars noted these potential costs 
early on, but in the heightened national security environment 
following September 11th, as well as the CNOOC and DPW 
controversies, CFIUS disregarded these concerns.  However, 
CFIUS’s growing prominence, as highlighted in the rejection of 
Ralls Corp.’s wind farm investment, has demonstrated the need for 
revisions to the CFIUS regulations. 
This paper proposes revisions that closely emulate the licensing 
process in U.S. export law, namely the EAA and AECA.  This 
process involves the listing of industries and technologies whose 
acquisition by a foreign entity CFIUS will presume to raise national 
security concerns.  This list should be considered in conjunction 
with a similar chart of countries and companies presumed to raise 
national security threats when investing in the United States.  
However, instead of prohibiting transactions appearing on these 
lists outright, CFIUS and the President should maintain 
discretionary authority to allow a listed transaction or block a non-
listed transaction, respectively.  The requirement that redacted 
reports be published on every discretionary decision would limit 
the uncertainty generated by preserving CFIUS’s discretionary 
authority over national security concerns without raising 
significant confidentiality concerns for investors.  Therefore, by 
implementing these revisions, CFIUS could better achieve its 
objective of encouraging FDI in the United States while diligently 
protecting the United States from national security risks stemming 
from select foreign investments.  
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